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The United Nations Security Council’s Implementation
of the Responsibility to Protect:
A Review of Past Interventions and Recommendations
for Improvement
Jared Genser *

Abstract
When it was codified and adopted by the United Nations (U.N.) system in 2005, the
doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was meant to provide an implementation
mechanism for the international community to respond to governments that were perpetrating
mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
against their own people. As R2P is now in its second decade of existence as a codified norm, it
is important to comprehensively evaluate past implementation of R2P by the United Nations
Security Council—the U.N. body charged with taking collective action when all other
diplomacy has failed and atrocity crimes are being committed or are imminent. This Article
analyzes eleven country-specific case studies, which demonstrate that the presence of certain
conditions enable the U.N. Security Council to successfully implement its R2P mandate.
Further, when the identified conditions are absent, implementation is generally unsuccessful.
Given these conditions, this Article identifies recommendations for strengthening international
institutions so that implementation of R2P by the Security Council in the coming decades will
successfully save civilian populations from mass atrocity crimes.
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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
It has been thirteen years since the 2005 United Nations (U.N.) World
Summit, and, with it, the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). With
the highly visible atrocities being committed in Syria and the recent renewed
focus on the human rights conditions in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, the question of how successfully the United Nations Security Council
(Security Council) can implement its responsibilities under R2P has again risen
to the forefront of international politics. As the doctrine of R2P is well into its
second decade after being formally adopted by the U.N. system, a
comprehensive evaluation of its application since 2005 is essential to improving
its successful implementation in the decades ahead to protect civilian
populations from mass atrocity crimes.
R2P developed in response to the recurring failures of individual states to
protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing—collectively considered mass atrocity crimes1—as well as a
failure of the international community, including the U.N., to prevent these
atrocities. At the U.N. Millennium Assembly in 2000, U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan challenged the international community to strengthen its protection
of vulnerable populations against “gross and systematic violations of human
rights,” calling to mind the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.2 SecretaryGeneral Annan acknowledged that states that perpetrated these crimes against
their own populations or stood by while non-state actors did the same would
have to confront the idea that humanitarian intervention represented an
“unacceptable assault on sovereignty.”3
In response to Annan’s challenge, Canada established the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which developed and
published the 2001 report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, introducing the
concept of R2P for the first time.4 Following the Commission’s report, a more
1

While ethnic cleansing is not a crime under international law in its own right, acts of ethnic
cleansing may constitute one of the other three mass atrocity crimes described. See U.N.
Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009)
[hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect].

2

U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, 48, U.N.
Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000) [hereinafter We the Peoples]. For a history of U.N. engagement
with humanitarian intervention and discussion of the challenges it represented to the U.N. in
2004, prior to the adoption of R2P, see Sir Adam Roberts, The United Nations and Humanitarian
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71 (Jennifer M.
Welsh ed., 2004).

3

U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 2, at 48.

4

INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
1 (2001), https://perma.cc/28Z5-X9EL [hereinafter The Responsibility to Protect] (“The
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narrowly-framed formulation of R2P was adopted by the U.N. High Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change in the 21st Century and in the SecretaryGeneral’s report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights
for All.5 The evolution and narrowing of the principle in these two reports
provided the basis for the adoption of R2P into the U.N. system.
At the 2005 World Summit, over 170 heads of state and government—
one of the largest such gatherings in history6—agreed to adopt R2P and defined
it in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, which
was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly shortly thereafter.7 Paragraphs 138
and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, the text which provides the
operative basis for the doctrine,8 explains that R2P affirms existing requirements
in international treaty law and customary international law: “each individual State
has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and is responsible for “the
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and
necessary means.”9 The World Summit Outcome Document recognizes that the
international community should assist states in exercising that responsibility and
in building their protection capacities.10 It further says that the international
community—through the U.N.—is responsible for using appropriate means,

report[’s] . . . central theme, reflected in the title, is ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, the idea that
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—
from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do,
that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”). The genesis of the
Commission’s understanding of state sovereignty as encompassing responsibilities and its
formulation of “the responsibility to protect” was in the work of the U.N.’s First Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Francis Deng in the 1980s on states’
obligations to accept life-supporting protection and assistance for their citizens, where they are
unable to provide it, and the international responsibility to act where a state’s failure to do so
threatens a large number of lives. See THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 25 (2d
ed. 2012). Deng also served as the first U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide from
2007 until 2012.
5

See U.N. Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General, in A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, ¶¶ 34, 35, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3 (Mar. 21, 2005).

6

William W. Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME 17, 21 n.18 (Jared Genser
et al. eds., 2011).

7

G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Oct. 24, 2005).

8

Burke-White, supra note 6, at 22.

9

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 7, at ¶ 138.

10

Id.
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including those provided in Chapters VI through VIII of the U.N. Charter,11 to
help protect populations against mass atrocity crimes when a state is “manifestly
failing” to protect its population. Under such circumstances, the international
community should take collective action, through the United Nations and
including, if necessary, by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis in a
“timely and decisive manner.”12
The Security Council welcomed the adoption of the World Summit
Outcome Document in a resolution of its own one month after the World
Summit ended,13 highlighting the importance of cooperation between the U.N.
and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security.
Several months later, in April 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1674, which went further to explicitly reaffirm the “responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity” as defined in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome
Document, and to call on states to meet that responsibility.14
The strategy for implementing R2P within the U.N. system was
subsequently defined by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his 2009 report,
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.15 The strategy consisted of three pillars
drawn from the framework of the relevant World Summit Outcome Document
paragraphs: the protection responsibilities of the state (Pillar I), international
assistance and capacity-building (Pillar II), and the timely and decisive response
of the international community once a state has failed to protect its own civilian
population (Pillar III).16 The World Summit Outcome Document and SecretaryGeneral’s reports outline the obligations of U.N. member states to respond
collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a state is manifestly failing to
protect its population.17 In implementing R2P, the Security Council serves an
integral role. While there are numerous ways for the Secretary-General and other
U.N. agencies to engage to prevent mass atrocity crimes, R2P calls on the
Security Council to use the full range of its powers under Chapters VI to VIII of
the U.N. Charter if and when other actions are insufficient. The Security
11

For specific mechanisms under Chapters VI and VII, see Section II(A), infra.

12

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 7, at ¶ 139.

13

S.C. Res. 1631, ¶ 8 (Oct. 17, 2005).

14

S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). In the same year, the U.N. Security Council also recalled this
earlier reaffirmation in the second paragraph to the preamble of its Resolution 1706 on the
Darfur crisis. See S.C. Res. 1706, ¶ 2 (Aug. 31, 2006).

15

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1.

16

Id., at 2. For more detailed explanations of each Pillar, see Section II(B), infra.

17

U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc
A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
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Council’s leadership and engagement with implementing R2P is therefore
essential to the ultimate success or failure of R2P.
To date, no independent analysis has been conducted to evaluate various
conditions that have led to successful or unsuccessful implementations of R2P
by the Security Council in country-specific contexts. An analysis of Security
Council implementation of R2P provides important guidance for future
implementation of its mandate. This Article undertakes that analysis in three
parts.
Section II explains the Security Council’s role in implementing R2P given
the specific responsibility assigned to the Council by R2P’s original text and the
U.N. Charter.
Section III discusses the Security Council’s engagement with R2P in eleven
country-specific cases where mass atrocity crimes were occurring. Section III is
divided into three subsections. Subsection A examines three successful
implementations of R2P by the Security Council while Subsection B examines
four unsuccessful implementations based on various conditions that were
present or absent in the country-specific R2P crises. This Article identifies three
conditions that have generally needed to be present for the Security Council to
successfully implement its R2P mandate: (1) there must be no government
obstruction from the state in which mass atrocity crimes are being perpetrated,
or, if government obstruction exists, one of the five permanent members of the
Security Council (P5 member) must provide political will to overcome
obstruction; (2) there must be cooperation between regional organizations and
the Security Council; and (3) the Council must have the capacity to respond
rapidly to the unfolding situation. As Subsection A demonstrates, all three
conditions are necessary for successful implementation, while the absence of
these conditions is more likely to lead to unsuccessful R2P implementation by
the Security Council.
Finally, Subsection C specifically presents four situations in which
implementation of R2P has been stalled due to the institutional design of the
Security Council, which enables P5 members to stop all substantive action using
their veto. Taking into account the lessons learned from successful and
unsuccessful implementations of R2P, Section IV offers recommendations for
the Security Council to ensure that the response to future mass atrocity crimes is
more successful.
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II. R O L E

O F T H E U.N. S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L A N D T H E
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The Security Council is considered “the critical body ultimately responsible
for discharging the international response” under the principle of R2P.18
Subsection A begins by discussing the Security Council’s role in operationalizing
R2P, as derived from the text of the World Summit Outcome Document on
R2P and the Council’s mandate under the U.N. Charter. Subsection B discusses
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s interpretation of the Security Council’s role,
as laid out in his 2009 report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. This
discussion provides a foundation for understanding why the Security Council’s
engagement on R2P is centrally important to the successful implementation of
R2P.

A. The Primary Texts for Implementing R2P: The World
Summit
Outcome
Document
and
the
United
Nations Charter
The starting point for analyzing the role of the Security Council in the
implementation of R2P is the text of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, which was adopted by the General Assembly.
This text provides the international community’s mandate for R2P:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to
protect populations from [the mass atrocity crimes of] genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate,
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations.19

The key innovation of the doctrine is the assertion of an obligation on the
part of the international community to protect civilian populations from mass
atrocity crimes. The reference to the “international community” here describes,
broadly, U.N. member states, regional organizations, the General Assembly, the
Security Council, and other U.N. bodies. The obligation on the part of the
international community under paragraph 139 is complementary to the
18

Burke-White, supra note 6, at 30 n.6.

19

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 7, at ¶ 139 (emphasis added).
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responsibility of the state under paragraph 138 to protect its own population
against mass atrocity crimes.20 Importantly, the adoption of R2P did not impose
a new obligation on the international community, but rather clarified an existing
responsibility that was already firmly embedded in treaty law and customary
international law to prevent mass atrocity crimes.21
While the concept of an international responsibility to protect is novel, the
proposed means for enacting the concept were already well established, as they
are contained within the U.N. Charter. Paragraph 139 of the World Summit
Outcome Document does not extend the powers of the international
community beyond those already set out in Chapters VI to VIII of the U.N.
Charter.22
Moreover, while the international community’s collective action may arise
from the Secretary-General and Secretariat, and while it falls within the
competencies of multiple U.N. bodies, the text of paragraph 139 envisages the
Security Council as the preeminent U.N. organ responsible for implementing
R2P in the U.N. system when all other actions have failed. Collective action by
the international community flows through the actions of the Security Council.
This is consistent with the role of the Security Council under Article 24 in
Chapter V of the Charter, in which members of the U.N. “confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.”23
It follows that under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council is a
key player in the “pacific settlement of disputes,” with the power to make
recommendations for resolving situations that it deems “likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.”24 Where the Security Council
determines an actual threat to or breach of peace, or an act of aggression under
Article 39, Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may require states to
undertake action—individually or collectively—to maintain international peace
20

Id. at ¶ 138.

21

Burke-White, supra note 6, at 25; see also Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 18
(“As noted above, the obligations of States that underpin pillar one [under paragraph 138 of the
World Summit Outcome Document] are firmly embedded in pre-existing, treaty-based and
customary international law.”).

22

This was reiterated in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on operationalizing R2P. See
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 3 (“[A]ctions . . . are to be undertaken only
in conformity with the provisions, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.”).

23

U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.

24

U.N. Charter arts. 33–38. Also see Janet Benshoof, Women, Peace, and Security, in THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 68, 71 (Jared Genser & Bruno
Stagno Ugarte eds., 2014) for a discussion of the Council’s powers under Chapters VI and VII,
generally, and the distinction between them.
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and security. This ability is unique to the Security Council as an organ of the
U.N.25 Under Article 25 of the Charter, it is noted that “[m]embers of the U.N.
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter.”26 Article 25 has been interpreted as binding member
states to implement the Council’s decisions made under Chapter VII,27 even
where the implementation of such decisions might conflict with other
international obligations.28 Under Chapter VII, the Council can impose coercive
measures not entailing the use of force and can authorize the use of force when
other measures have failed to restore international peace and security.29
With broad Chapter VI and VII powers to make decisions and coordinate
U.N. action in situations endangering or threatening international peace and
security, the Security Council is uniquely placed within the U.N. system to
respond powerfully and flexibly to protect populations from mass atrocity
crimes. Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document recognizes the
Security Council’s unique capability in this regard, as it states that collective
action would occur “through the Security Council, in accordance with the
Charter.”30 It is important to note that R2P does not legitimize collective action
taken outside the U.N., unless such action has the explicit and specific support
of relevant U.N. organs.31

25

The General Assembly can address issues of the maintenance of international peace and security
under the “[u]niting for peace” procedure, where the Security Council “fails to exercise its
responsibility with regard to international peace and security because of the lack of unanimity
among its five permanent members.” Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 63.
However, it is noted that “even in such cases . . . Assembly decisions are not legally binding on
the parties.” Id.

26

U.N. Charter art. 25; see also Sir Michael Wood, Senior Fellow at the University of Cambridge
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, The U.N.
Security Council and International Law, First Lecture: The Legal Framework of the Security
Council, ¶ 31 (Nov. 7, 2006), https://perma.cc/UHR4-N5ND (reaffirming the power of the
Security Council under the U.N. Charter to issue binding decisions on members of the U.N.).

27

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, 25(B)(II) (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2002).

28

U.N. Charter art. 103; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 27,
at 266–67 (“Article 103 functions as a de facto international supremacy clause mandating that a
state’s U.N. obligations override its other international commitments.”).

29

U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.

30

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 7, at ¶ 139.

31

Including, for example, what residual obligations or powers might attach to the General Assembly
and regional organizations. For a discussion of this, see Burke-White, supra note 6, at 29.
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B. Characteristics of R2P and the U.N. Security Council’s
Role in Implementation
The challenge for R2P continues to be the “turning [of] the authoritative
and enduring words of the 2005 World Summit Outcome into doctrine, policy
and, most importantly, deeds.”32
In the 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon presented three pillars to define how to implement R2P within the
U.N. system. These are: Pillar I, asserting that every state has a responsibility to
protect against mass atrocity crimes, which are defined as genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; Pillar II, affirming that the wider
international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in
meeting their Pillar I responsibility; and Pillar III, confirming that if a state
manifestly fails to protect its population, the international community must take
appropriate collective action in a timely manner in accordance with the U.N.
Charter.33 The Secretary-General delivered his report to the General Assembly,
where it enjoyed broad support.34
After framing the three-pillared approach, Ban outlined the characteristics
of the R2P doctrine in seven subsequent reports released during his tenure as
Secretary-General, which were prepared with the assistance of the Special
Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect and
informed by the annual dialogues in the General Assembly.35 These
characteristics of the R2P spoke generally to its implementation within the U.N.
system and specifically to the responsibility the Security Council carries as the
institution ultimately charged with implementing R2P if other actions have failed
to be effective.

1. “Narrow but deep” explains the R2P’s focus on mass atrocities
and its broad toolset for prevention and response within the U.N.
system.
A central characteristic of R2P is that the implementation of the mandate is

32

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 67.

33

Id.

34

INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, REPORT ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
PLENARY DEBATE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 4 (Sept. 15, 2009),
https://perma.cc/N9PQ-FCLV (“Out of the 94 statements delivered, . . . [a] clear majority of
governments . . . [w]elcomed the report of the Secretary-General.”); see also G.A. Res. 63/308, ¶ 3
(Oct. 7, 2009) (noting the Secretary-General’s report).

35

See Core Documents: Understanding RtoP, ICRTOP, https://perma.cc/RWG2-2RVM (last visited
Nov. 18, 2017).
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“narrow but deep.”36 That is, while the application of R2P is narrowly restricted
to mass atrocity crimes, it is deep in terms of the broad array of tools available
through the U.N. system to address these violations, up to and including action
by the Security Council.37 This encompasses a wide range of implementation
instruments, including: preventative measures like monitoring and warning systems
for mass atrocity crimes, institution-building, and diplomatic efforts; protective
measures once mass atrocity crimes are committed, including refugee camps for
fleeing populations, coercive measures against perpetrators including targeted
individual sanctions on travel and finance, and the use of force; and post-hoc
measures for responding to mass atrocity crimes, including creating international
commissions of inquiry, referring cases to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) for prosecution, and assisting local efforts for truth and reconciliation.38
The depth of engagement required by R2P combined with the breadth of
mechanisms available to the U.N. means various organs must be engaged in
implementing R2P in coordination with the Security Council. With respect to
the U.N.’s intergovernmental organs, the General Assembly is well positioned to
contribute to R2P through its mandates under Articles 10 through 14 of the
Charter,39 the Uniting for Peace mechanism,40 and its regional and sub-regional
mechanisms.41 The Secretary-General, Special Advisers—particularly the Special
Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect—and
Special Envoys are central to leading the public international and diplomatic
response to mass atrocity crimes, including providing ready access to their good
offices.42 The Secretariat also serves a central role in gathering impartial
assessment of information regarding the threat and perpetration of mass atrocity
crimes against civilian populations and in ensuring information flows in a timely

36

U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 17, at ¶ 9.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at ¶ 30. Generally, the U.N. General Assembly can discuss and make recommendations to
member states and the U.N. Security Council, and can call matters to the Council’s attention. See
also U.N. Charter arts. 10, 14.

40

See, for example, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 57. On November 3, 1950,
the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 377A(V), “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, G.A.
Res. 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR Nov. 3, 1950, which authorizes the General Assembly to seize the
U.N. Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security if the Council fails due to lack of unanimity. See Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace,
U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW, at 1 (2008), https://perma.cc/7NQS-P8XR.

41

See, for example, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 56.

42

Id. at ¶ 10(d).
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manner to U.N. decision-makers.43
Other U.N. bodies are well placed to contribute to the implementation of
R2P by utilizing their good offices for persuasion, education, training, and
assistance. These include the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
U.N. Human Rights Council, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and
the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator.44 Furthermore, U.N. factfinding
missions and commissions of inquiry can contribute to preventing further mass
atrocity crimes and can assist in establishing the facts and identities of
perpetrators in their aftermath.45 With so many bodies of the U.N. involved in
carrying out R2P, the “[leadership] role [of] the Security Council in carrying
forward [its] mandate” becomes especially important,46 as the Charter uniquely
enables it to make decisions binding on all member states.

2. The U.N. Security Council’s leadership has a critical mandate
under R2P.
As envisioned by the World Summit Outcome Document and the General
Assembly adoption of the doctrine of R2P, the Security Council is integral in
implementing the international community’s timely and decisive R2P response
when an R2P crisis emerges. As the U.N.’s most powerful organ, the Security
Council ultimately should make “[d]ecisions about collective action, as well as
judgments about whether peaceful means are inadequate and whether ‘national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect.’”47 The implementation of the
Security Council’s R2P mandate relies upon its capacity to threaten and
authorize enforcement measures, as well as to enact Chapter VI and VII
resolutions, thereby “challenging the international community to live up to its
own responsibilities under paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome.”48 The
implementation of R2P requires the Security Council’s willingness to engage
directly with this aspect of its capacities when implementing R2P.
Considering the depth of engagement the U.N. can pursue, the Security
43

Id. at ¶ 10(c); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to
Protect, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010) [hereinafter Early Warning] (“Decisions about
collective action . . . are normally informed, at least in part, by information and assessments
provided by the Secretariat. . . . In such cases, the quality and timeliness of the inputs from the
Secretariat are vital.”).

44

See, for example, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 30.

45

U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 17, at ¶ 12.

46

See, for example, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 69–70 (noting also that the
U.N. General Assembly’s leadership is also important to implementing R2P but a further
discussion of its role is beyond the scope of this paper).

47

Early Warning, supra note 43, at ¶ 5.

48

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 56.
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Council’s specific role in implementing R2P primarily lies within Pillar III: to
facilitate the collective response of the international community when a state
fails to meet its Pillar I responsibility of protecting its own population.49 While
much commentary on the Security Council’s role under Pillar III focuses upon
its capacity to authorize humanitarian intervention under Article 42 of the U.N.
Charter, Pillar III calls on the Council to engage with a much broader range of
potential pacific and coercive enforcement measures.50 These measures include
the recommendation or authorization of Chapter VI mechanisms, such as peace
negotiations, monitoring or observer missions, and commissions of inquiry.51
Additionally, when a state fails to respond to those peaceful and diplomatic
efforts, the Security Council can also employ more coercive measures under
Article 53 of the Charter, such as sanctions, arms embargoes, or referrals to the
ICC. Finally, the Security Council can authorize military action through the U.N.
or a regional organization, including, for example, establishing a no-fly zone or
the deployment of troops.52 Overall, the Security Council has significant
flexibility when responding to an R2P crisis in determining how to implement its
responsibility.
An important limitation to address—considered in more detail and
country-specific application below53—is that although the Security Council has
“extraordinary capacity” under the U.N. Charter to address situations of
imminent or occurring mass atrocity crimes through implementation of R2P,54
the Council’s institutional architecture imposes constraints upon its capacity to
implement the R2P. By structural design, the Security Council maintains an
49

Id. at ¶¶ 33, 34, 36, 40–42; U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive
Response, supra note 17, at ¶ 14. For example, in putting into practice the commitment of the
international community to assist states in their capacity to meet their R2P obligations, the U.N.
Security Council might encourage dialogue between different U.N. organs as well as member
states on human rights and humanitarian standards and norms, see Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 33, as well as monitor thematic areas of concern internationally such as
widespread and systematic sexual violence, id. at ¶ 34, including requiring reporting from states or
the Secretary-General and permitting open debate in the Council on the issue, id. at ¶ 36. The
Council might also resolve to provide international collective peacekeeping or military assistance
to States, with their consent, to assist them in meeting their protection obligations, id. at ¶ 40,
including by preventative deployment, i.e., to facilitate disarmament, to counter armed groups
seeking to intimidate civilians, and to prevent the escalation of armed conflict, id. at ¶¶ 40–42.

50

See U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 17, at ¶
11(c).

51
52

53
54

Id. at ¶¶ 22, 27–28.
See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 11(c), 56, 58; see also U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 31–32.
See Section III, infra.
Jared Genser & Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Conclusion, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN
THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 463.
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unequal distribution of power between its members.55 Five of the Security
Council’s fifteen members, China, France, the U.K., the U.S., and Russia—that
is, its P5 members—carry the institutional advantage of permanent tenure56 and
retain veto power in the Council’s non-procedural decision-making by vote
under Article 27(2) of the U.N. Charter.57 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted
that their power and tenure impose upon P5 members “particular responsibility”
under R2P and he urged them “to refrain from employing or threatening to
employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to
the responsibility to protect . . . and to reach a mutual understanding to that
effect.”58 However, a commitment of this kind among the P5 has been elusive,
creating a danger of limiting the Security Council’s capacity to implement R2P
by the political will of its permanent members.

3. The three pillars of R2P are equally important.
Finally, the Secretary-General has stressed that all three pillars of R2P are
equally important and designed to function interdependently, rather than in
isolation.59 As the Secretary-General stated: “[l]ike any other edifice, the
structure of the responsibility to protect relies on the equal size, strength and
viability of each of its supporting pillars. . . . [U]nless all three pillars are strong
the edifice could implode and collapse.”60 For the Security Council, this means
that the pillars are not designed to be applied sequentially or in an arbitrarily
graduated process.61 Further, there is a degree of overlap between pillars,
particularly Pillar II and III. For example, with regard to International
Commissions of Inquiry, “international assistance under pillar two . . . relating to
RtoP can also be a pillar three action insofar as it constitutes a timely and
decisive response.”62
While the Security Council’s main implementation strength lies with Pillar
III, its early engagement to encourage a state’s Pillar I responsibility to protect its
own civilian population is vitally important. The Secretary-General suggested
55

Nicole Deller, Challenges and Controversies, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 6, at 78.

56

Id.

57

Genser & Stagno Ugarte, supra note 54, at 464–65.

58

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 61.

59

Id. at ¶ 12 (“If the three supporting pillars were of unequal length, the edifice of the responsibility
to protect could become unstable.”); id. at ¶ 29 (“[N]one of the pillars is designed to work in
isolation from the others.”).

60

Id. at Summary; id. at ¶ 12. See also Edward C. Luck, From Promise to Practice: Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 6, at 97 (“[E]ach of the
three [pillars] is essential to a balanced and effective strategy.”).

61

U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 17, at ¶ 13.

62

Id. at ¶ 12.
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that “credible and proportionate action under pillar three, in accordance with the
Charter, may help to encourage States to assume their responsibilities under
pillar one.”63 For example, Security Council-imposed sanctions can serve as a
warning to states of the Council’s willingness to apply tougher measures should
the state continue to fail to meet its Pillar I protection responsibilities while
signaling to the international community that it is committed to implementing its
R2P responsibilities.64

III. T H E U.N. S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L ’ S I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
R2P I N C O U N T R Y -S P E C I F I C S I T U A T I O N S

OF

This Section examines the Security Council’s implementation of its R2P
mandate in eleven country-specific cases where mass atrocity crimes were
committed and the Security Council has invoked R2P in some capacity.65 It is
further divided into three subsections to better evaluate specific conditions that
have facilitated the successful or unsuccessful implementation of R2P by the
Security Council.
When examining the past thirteen years of R2P implementation by the
Security Council, there are three conditions that emerge as being determinative
for whether the Security Council successfully or unsuccessfully implements R2P.
First, there is either no obstruction by the government committing mass atrocity
crimes, or, if government obstruction does take place, an interested P5 country
provides the political will to overcome the government obstruction. Second,
cooperation exists between regional organizations—like the African Union
(A.U.) or neighboring regional powers—and the Security Council to coordinate
the R2P response given the particular crisis in each country. Third, the Security
Council has at its disposal a rapid response capacity to react to the perpetration
of atrocity crimes in an efficient and effective manner to protect civilians.
Subsection A examines three case studies in which the Security Council
successfully implemented R2P: Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali. After discussing
the historical, political, and cultural background that led to the outbreak of
atrocity crimes on a widespread and systematic scale, each case will trace the

63

Id. at ¶ 17.

64

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 1, at ¶ 57.

65

While the case can arguably be made for R2P crises in more countries, this paper focuses on
eleven countries where atrocity crimes reached a high enough threshold to be considered
widespread and systematic. Further, this article will only examine cases were atrocities were largely
being committed by state actors or opposition groups acting as state actors, since the principle of
R2P as functioning under the U.N. imparts obligations and responsibility on state actors rather
than non-state actors. Countries where atrocities were being committed almost exclusively by
terrorist organizations will not be discussed.
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actions by the Security Council, as well as other authorities, organizations, and
individuals, in responding to the crisis. Evidence demonstrates that the Security
Council successfully implemented R2P in these cases because all three
conditions were met in each case, which allowed the Council to act in a timely
and decisive manner to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.
Looking through the lens of the same three conditions, Subsection B
examines four country-cases where either one or two of these conditions were
substantially lacking, leading to unsuccessful implementations of R2P. The four
cases—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, and the
Central African Republic—fail at least one condition, thus preventing the
mobilization of forces and resources necessary to stop mass atrocity crimes as
the crises were developing. These cases are considered unsuccessful in the sense
that the implementation of R2P was not timely or decisive and failed to prevent
mass atrocity crimes.
Finally, Subsection C evaluates the impact of a fourth condition: the
Security Council veto. Examining the role of the veto in the cases of Yemen,
Syria, Myanmar, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea demonstrates
the devastating impact that the internal composition of the Security Council can
have as it effectively stalls the Council R2P response.

A. U.N. Security Council’s Successful Implementation of R2P
For the Security Council to successfully implement its R2P mandate, three
conditions must be present: (1) no government obstruction from the state where
mass atrocity crimes are occurring, or, if government obstruction does occur,
then P5-level interest exists that can overcome government obstruction; (2)
cooperation between regional organizations and the Security Council exists to
effectively mobilize resources depending on the nature of the crisis; and (3) the
Security Council or an external actor acting with the authorization of the
Security Council has the capacity to rapidly respond to the crisis. In the
following three case studies, all three conditions existed, allowing for successful
R2P implementation by the Security Council to prevent further commissions of
mass atrocity crimes.

1. Côte d’Ivoire
Following opposition contender Alassane Ouattara’s resounding electoral
victory in Côte d’Ivoire’s November 28, 2010 presidential runoff election,
incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo announced that he would not accept the
results of the election.66 With Gbagbo refusing to concede office and Ouattara
66

The Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ICRTOP, https://perma.cc/YRW9-JWNX (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
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refusing to stand down, each candidate declared himself the winner, took the
presidential oath, and appointed a prime minister.67 As Gbagbo refused to vacate
the presidential palace, Ouattara established his seat of government in the Hotel
du Golf in the Ivorian capital and was quickly barricaded in by pro-Gbagbo
forces.68 The contested election reignited longstanding tensions and violence
between the Christian South, represented by Gbagbo, and the rebel-held Muslim
North, represented by Ouattara.
After the election, pro-Gbagbo groups began attacking Ouattara
supporters and immigrants from neighboring West African countries,
responding to Gbagbo’s call to “denounce” foreigners and leave Côte d’Ivoire to
the “real” Ivorians.69 Throughout December 2010, violent clashes increased and
combatants on both sides committed war crimes and crimes against humanity,
including execution of detainees, targeted killings of civilians and demonstrators,
extrajudicial killings, rape and sexual violence, forced disappearance, persecution
of non-Ivorian nationals, and destruction of civilian property.70 By January 13,
2011, there were an estimated 400 civilian deaths, 23,500 refugees in surrounding
countries, and 16,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the
conflict.71
In response to the escalation of violence, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1962 on December 20, 2010, transforming the mandate of the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)—which had been
stationed in the country since the conclusion of its civil war in 200472—and
reauthorizing “all necessary means” for UNOCI to carry out its peacekeeping
function and civilian protection mandate, “particularly in light of the current
risks for human rights and civilians in the country.”73 The Security Council
further reminded Côte d’Ivoire of its Pillar I R2P responsibility to protect its
civilian population.74 Resolution 1962 also invoked an inter-mission cooperation
arrangement between UNOCI and the nearby United Nations Mission in Liberia

67

Id.

68

Adam Nossiter, Ivory Coast Leader’s Rival Remains Under Blockade, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/world/africa/06ivory.html.

69

Côte d’Ivoire: Crimes Against Humanity by Gbagbo Forces, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 15, 2011),
https://perma.cc/6HA7-9YVP.

70

Id.

71

U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Statement Attributed to the U.N.
Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the
Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Jan. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/7JJ3-67XB.

72

S.C. Res. 1528 (Feb. 27, 2004).

73

S.C. Res. 1962, ¶¶ 3, 14, 15 (Dec. 20, 2010).

74

Id. at pmbl.
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(UNMIL) to authorize the temporary redeployment of peacekeeping troops
from UNMIL to UNOCI.75
On December 29, 2010, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
Francis Deng and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck
urged the Security Council to view the situation through the lens of R2P, issuing
a joint statement reminding all parties in Côte d’Ivoire of their Pillar I
obligations under R2P “to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”76 In early January 2011, Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon recommended several measures to the President of the
Security Council to ensure UNOCI was able “to make credible efforts to protect
civilians.”77 On January 19, 2011, the Special Advisers once again specifically
warned about the potential of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and ethnic cleansing in the country, and recommended “urgent steps should be
taken, in line with ‘the responsibility to protect,’ to avert the risk of genocide and
ensure the protection of all those at risk of mass atrocities.”78 Ten days later, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1967,79 which authorized the
deployment of additional UNOCI military personnel80 and reiterated that “all
necessary means” should be employed to carry out UNOCI’s mandate, including
“protection of civilians.”81
By March 2011, a broad group of regional and international bodies,
including the A.U. Peace and Security Council,82 ECOWAS,83 and the E.U.,84
75

Id. at ¶ 7.

76

Press Release, U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, U.N. SecretaryGeneral’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on
the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Dec. 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/53RN-F8RL.

77

U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 7 January 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2011/5 (Jan. 10, 2011).

78

U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Statement Attributed to the U.N.
Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the
Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Jan. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/4U4K-FN3X.

79

S.C. Res. 1967, ¶¶ 3, 14, 15 (Jan. 19, 2011); Press Release, Security Council, Amid Deteriorating
Security Situation, Ongoing Political Impasse in Côte d’Ivoire, Security Council Bolsters
Peacekeeping Mission There by 2,000 Additional Troops, U.N. Press Release SC/10156 (Jan. 19,
2011).
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S.C. Res. 1967, supra note 79, at ¶ 1.
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Id. at ¶ 8.
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The African Union adopted African Union High Implementation Panel [AUHIP]’s
recommendation of recognizing Outtara as president on March 10, 2011. See African Union Peace
and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Côte
d’Ivoire, at ¶¶ 3, 5, PSC/PR/2 (CCLXXIII) (Apr. 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/JG4D-JJTN;
African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council, PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (CCLXV) (Mar. 10, 2011), https://perma.cc/4QRDLNND.

Winter 2018

437

Chicago Journal of International Law

had condemned the violence against civilians, recognizing Ouattara as the
winner of the presidential election and calling on Gbagbo to step down.
ECOWAS further requested that the Security Council strengthen UNOCI’s
mandate and permit the use of force to ensure that Gbagbo step down.85 The
Human Rights Council, for its part, established an independent, international
commission of inquiry into the alleged abuses and rights violations on March 25,
2011.86
Despite these measures, pro-Gbagbo forces began using heavy weapons—
including “mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and heavy machine guns”—
against civilians and U.N. peacekeepers.87 Additionally, a three-day period of
fighting between pro-Gbagbo forces and pro-Ouattara forces in late March 2011
led to a massacre of civilians in the town of Duékoué, with Ivan Šimonović,
Assistant Secretary-General of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, estimating that 255 civilians were killed88 and some human rights
organizations putting the number as high as 1,000.89 The Duékoué massacre
internally displaced a further 28,000 civilians.90
On March 30, 2011, the Security Council responded to these developments
by adopting Resolution 1975, which reiterated UNOCI’s “all necessary means”

83

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission, Final Communique, at ¶
25, ECW/HSG/ABJ/39 (Mar. 23-24, 2011), https://perma.cc/WT78-T7XF (expressing concern
for the “fast deteriorating security and humanitarian situation” and urging the “speedy transfer of
power” from Gbagbo to Ouattara).

84

Presidency Conclusions D/10/5, ¶ 11, Brussels European Council (Jan. 25, 2011),
https://perma.cc/Q2EG-YL22 (“It called on all Ivorian leaders, both civilian and military, who
have not yet done so to place themselves under the authority of the democratically elected
President, Mr. Alassan Ouattara.”).

85

U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 24 March 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, ¶¶ 11, 12, U.N.
Doc. S/2011/182 (Mar. 24, 2011).

86

Human Rights Council Res. 16/25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/25, at ¶ 10 (Mar. 25, 2011).
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U.N. Secretary-General, Twenty-seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, ¶¶ 44, 48, 64, U.N. Doc. S/2011/211 (Mar. 30, 2011); see also Adam
Nossiter, Strikes by U.N. and France Corner Leader of Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05ivory.html.

88

Press Release, Press Conference on Situation in Côte d’Ivoire by Assistant Secretary-General of
New York Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at ¶ 7 (Apr. 11,
2011), https://perma.cc/7WXU-PQFR.
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(Apr.
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Press Release, Top U.N. Official Tells Security Council Post-Electoral Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire
Ended; Says ‘I Remain Hopeful’, as Country Moves towards Reconciliation, Reconstruction, ¶ 18,
U.N. Press Release SC/10223 (Apr. 13, 2011).
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mandate to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence . . .
including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population”
and imposed targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his inner circle for the
“obstruct[ion of] the work of UNOCI” and the “commi[ssion of] serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”91 In a press
conference following the unanimous adoption of the resolution,92 Security
Council members invoked the Council’s R2P mandate, stating: “Let there be no
doubt that this situation is a collective global responsibility. We must act now.”93
Just days later, on April 4, 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon gave his
formal authorization for a U.N. and French military response, pursuant to
Resolution 1975.94 Later that afternoon, a U.N. military helicopter fired directly
on Gbagbo’s forces, taking out their heavy weapons systems and effectively
preventing any further use of heavy artillery against civilians.95 This intervention
reversed the course of the conflict, and Gbagbo was arrested by Outtara’s forces
eight days later.96 In May 2011, the Prosecutor of the ICC commenced an
investigation into the possible commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity97 and ultimately issued arrest warrants for Gbagbo on November 23,
2011, for four counts of crimes against humanity—for murder, rape, other
inhumane acts, and persecution—committed during the 2010–2011 postelection violence.98
The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire demonstrated the full power of the Security
Council’s timely and decisive action under R2P in the face of mass atrocity
crimes. It is also an example where all three conditions were met to allow the
Security Council to act to avert further atrocities, leading to a successful
91

S.C. Res. 1975, ¶¶ 6, 12 (Mar. 30, 2011).

92

See, for example, U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6058th Mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6508 (Mar. 30, 2011).
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Id. Ambassador Ogwu for Nigeria stated, “Let there be no doubt this is a situation of collective
global responsibility.” Id.
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U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 4 April from the Secretary-General addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2011/221 (Apr. 5, 2011). The letter requests the U.N.
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire “with the support of the French forces” to engage to protect civilians.
French president Nicolas Sarkozy echoed that U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had
requested French military assistance in accordance with Resolution 1975. See Ivory Coast Fighters
Surround Presidential Palace, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/ZQ3Q-6G84.

95

Rukmini Callimachi & Marco Chown Oved, U.N. Helicopter Fires at Gbagbo Ivory Coast Forces,
SALON (Apr. 4, 2011), https://perma.cc/6QA5-7SG3.
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The Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ICRTOP, supra note 66.
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Decision Assigning the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire to Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC02/11-1-Anx (May 20, 2011), https://perma.cc/4ZLD-TRTZ.
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Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, https://perma.cc/9EBY-JLTR. Gbagbo’s trial began
on January 28, 2016 and is ongoing as of publication. For updates on the case, visit Gbagbo and Blé
Goudé Case, Int’l Crim. Ct., https://perma.cc/C7DW-3UPD (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
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implementation of R2P. Here, the Security Council response faced no
obstruction from the legitimate and democratically-elected government and was
therefore able to respond efficiently to the growing threat of heavy weapons
against civilian communities. Further, the Security Council was able to quickly
escalate its level of engagement in response to the direct threat of heavy
weapons because of the regional support from the AU and ECOWAS. Both
supported Ouattara as the legitimate president of Côte d’Ivoire. Additionally,
ECOWAS explicitly requested the Security Council strengthen UNOCI’s
mandate, which it did shortly thereafter. Finally, the Security Council had the
rapid response capacity, as UNOCI and French troops were already deployed
and able to carry out the Secretary-General’s orders to protect civilians from
heavy artillery on the day they were issued. When UNOCI used military force
against pro-Gbagbo troops, it did so with the explicit and limited intent of
protecting civilian populations by disarming the heavy artillery systems Gbagbo’s
forces had deployed previously. All together, the Security Council responded to
the escalating crisis within one month after violence initially broke out.
Therefore, the Security Council’s full engagement with its R2P mandate
following the election violence in Côte d’Ivoire demonstrated a successful
implementation of R2P and prevented countless additional civilian casualties.

2. Libya
In early 2011, Libyans began to protest against the four-decade rule of
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The demonstrations commenced in Benghazi and
spread throughout the country.99 Qaddafi responded with extreme brutality,
deploying “heavy armor, artillery, the air force, and even foreign fighters against
his own citizens.”100 On February 22, 2011, Qaddafi gave a speech in which he
urged the cleansing of Libya “house by house” to find the “cockroaches”
protesting against him.101 Qaddafi then ordered his air force to bomb
opposition-held Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city.102
In response, the League of Arab States held an emergency meeting that
same day and suspended Libya’s membership.103 The Libyan representative to
the League of Arab States stepped down the same day, stating: “I have resigned
99

Philippe Kirsch & Mohamed S. Helal, Libya, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE
AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 396.
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Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2011), https://perma.cc/E8QE8Y7G.
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Libya Air Force Pilots Refuse Orders to Bomb Opposition-held Benghazi, HAARETZ (Feb. 23, 2011),
https://perma.cc/QE3U-6DCG.
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Arab League Suspends Libya Delegation—TV, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2011), https://perma.cc/KPC7VS5U.
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my post because it is dishonourable to serve a regime which kills its people and
annihilates them in this inhumane manner.”104 The Security Council immediately
issued a press statement welcoming the League’s position and condemning
Qaddafi’s repression of the demonstrators.105 The statement specifically called
upon the Libyan government “to meet its responsibility to protect its
population,”106 yet the regime continued attacking cities in which demonstrations
were occurring. On February 25, 2011, the Secretary-General briefed the
Security Council on indiscriminate killings and the shooting of peaceful
demonstrators in Libya and urged the Council to “be mindful of the urgency of
the moment.”107 On the same day, the Human Rights Council issued a resolution
calling on Libya to “meet its responsibility to protect its population,” noting that
the government’s violations potentially amounted to crimes against humanity.108
The following day, on February 26, 2011, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1970, in which it “condemn[ed] the violence and use of
force against civilians,” stated that the attacks against civilians “may amount to
crimes against humanity,” and “recall[ed] the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to
protect its population.”109 Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter,110 the Security Council adopted measures including an arms embargo,
travel bans, and asset freezes against the government’s senior leadership,
explicitly citing their involvement and complicity in “ordering, controlling, or
otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses.”111 The
Council also referred the situation to the ICC and expressed its willingness to
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take stronger measures if the Libyan authorities failed to comply.112
Within Libya, the protesters formed armed groups to fight against the
regime and advanced on multiple fronts in early March 2011.113 In response,
Qaddafi’s forces launched an offensive that pushed the rebels back toward
Benghazi.114 While international support for military intervention had initially
been slim and rebel groups on the ground themselves opposed military
intervention, the imminent threat of a massacre in Benghazi by Qaddafi’s forces
changed many minds. On March 7, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) passed
a resolution calling on the Security Council to take “all necessary measures” to
protect civilians in Libya.115 The League of Arab States adopted a resolution on
March 12, calling on the Security Council, “in view of the deterioration in the
situation in Libya, to shoulder its responsibilities and take the measures
necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aircraft and
establish safe havens in areas that are exposed to bombardment, as
precautionary measures that will provide protection for the Libyan people.”116
Empowered by the resolutions of the GCC and the League of Arab States,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, recalling the
terms of Resolution 1970, “[r]eiterating the responsibility of the Libyan
authorities to protect the Libyan population[,] and reaffirming that parties to
armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure
the protection of civilians.”117 The resolution also expressed the Security
Council’s “determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian
populated areas.”118 The operative parts of the resolution authorized member
states that have properly notified the Secretary-General “to take all necessary
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of
attack” in Libya and established a no-fly zone to help protect civilians.119
After notifying the Secretary-General,120 the U.S.-led coalition began
112
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preparations two days later and established a no-fly zone shortly thereafter.121
NATO assumed leadership of the military intervention and proceeded to target
the heavily armed ground troops loyal to Qaddafi, dealing a serious blow to
those forces approaching opposition-held Benghazi.122 NATO gradually
intensified bombing of Qaddafi’s forces and, by August 2011, rebels took
control of Tripoli and declared a victory for the revolution.123 Following the
rebel victory, the Security Council transformed its mandate to post-conflict
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/2011/150 (Mar. 20, 2011); Permanent Rep. of U.S., Letter dated 18 March 2011
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/152 (Mar. 20, 2011); Permanent Mission
of Denmark, Note verbale dated 18 March from the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/153 (Mar. 20, 2011);
Permanent Rep. of U.K., Letter dated 18 March 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/149 (Mar. 20, 2011); President of S.C., Letter dated 18
March 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. S/2011/151 (Mar. 18, 2011); Permanent Rep. of France, Letter dated 19 March 2011 from
the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. S/2011/155 (Mar. 20, 2011); Permanent Rep. of U.K., Letter dated 19 March
2011 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/157 (Mar.
20, 2011); Permanent Rep. of Lebanon, Identical letters dated 19 March 2011 from the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/65/792-S/2011/159 (Mar. 20, 2011);
Permanent Rep. of Italy, Letter dated 19 March 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Italy
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/158 (Mar. 20,
2011); Permanent Mission of Qatar, Letter dated 19 March 2011 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/2011/163 (Mar. 21, 2011); Permanent Rep. of Ukraine, Identical letters dated 19
March 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2011/164 (Mar. 21,
2011); Permanent Mission of France, Letter dated 22 March 2011 from the Permanent
Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/2011/175 (Mar. 23, 2011); Permanent Mission of Senegal, Letter dated 22 March 2011 from
the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. S/2011/172 (Mar. 22, 2011). Also see generally the letters sent to the U.N.
Security Council informing the Council of member states’ decisions to act pursuant to and in
accordance with Resolution 1973, sent between March 17-22, 2011, and available on pages 4–6,
UN Documents for Libya: Security Council Letters, SEC. COUNCIL REP., https://perma.cc/QYD2HD3Q (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
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peace-building, establishing the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) on
September 16, 2011 through Resolution 2009, which also partially lifted the
sanctions regime on the country.124 On October 27, Security Council Resolution
2016 ended the no-fly zone and authorization for use of force to protect Libyan
civilians.125 Meanwhile, Qaddafi was captured and killed extrajudicially in Libya
on October 20, 2011.126
Unfortunately, the interim government formed after Qaddafi’s overthrow
faced its own challenges in protecting civilians, as numerous militias previously
united against Qaddafi began fighting each other.127 However, the Security
Council’s engagement during the post-Qaddafi period has shied away from
explicitly invoking R2P and has instead been focused on state-building.
Despite controversy over the type and extent of NATO’s engagement after
the expiration of the R2P mandate,128 the Security Council’s full R2P
engagement in Libya was meaningful, timely, and decisive. Even though the
Security Council faced government obstruction as Qaddafi himself opposed
intervention, the strong support by the U.S., the U.K., and France—as well as a
broad coalition of other countries—was enough to overcome government
obstruction. After the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing use
of force to establish a no-fly zone, all three countries notified the Council of
their decision to take action and begin operations within two days following the
resolution adoption. Additionally, the R2P crisis in Libya also demonstrated the
importance of the cooperation between regional bodies and the Security
Council. The League of Arab States was the first to condemn Qaddafi’s actions
and a strong regional support by the League and the GCC helped push for R2P
intervention. Both the GCC and the League of Arab States called on the Security
Council to take all necessary measures and the League specifically requested the
establishment of a no-fly zone as a preventative measure to protect the Libyan
people. The Security Council responded by authorizing the request and
mobilizing the resources of member states to establish a no-fly zone within one
124
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week. Finally, the third condition—rapid response capacity—was also present, as
the military power of the U.S., U.K., France, and other NATO and coalition
countries was fully operationalized within one week of the Security Council
authorizing use of force to protect civilians. Within three weeks, the Security
Council was able to quickly escalate its response from invoking Libya’s Pillar I
responsibility to protect its citizens to a full “all necessary means” use of force
mission to protect civilians facing mass atrocity crimes perpetrated by Qaddafi’s
forces on the ground.
The R2P mission resulting from Resolution 1973 was considered a decisive
element in stopping mass atrocity crimes against the civilian population in Libya.
During the General Assembly informal debate on R2P in 2012, the Libyan
delegation was unequivocal in Libya’s support for R2P and noted that “the
international community’s rapid and decisive response via UNSC resolutions
1970 and 1973 averted a massacre and saved lives in the city of Benghazi.”129 As
a doctrine to protect against crimes against humanity and gross human rights
abuses, the delegation called R2P “one of the greatest achievements in the field
of human rights this century.”130

3. Mali
On March 22, 2012, a group of Malian soldiers staged a successful coup
d’état, sending the president of Mali into hiding and triggering the establishment
of a transition government.131 The group embodied a growing frustration within
the Malian military over the inability of the Malian government to provide
sufficient resources to fight Tuareg separatist rebels in northern Mali.132 The
Tuareg, a nomadic community from Saharan regions of Africa, had been
fighting the Malian government since the mid-1990s, seeking self-determination
in northern Mali.133 The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA), composed of various Tuareg groups, had formed in October 2011 and
was bolstered by the substantial increase of weapons and arms coming from
neighboring Libya following the downfall of Muammar Qaddafi.134 The
129
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frustrations within the Malian military had grown further as the MNLA won a
series of important military victories in northern Mali in January 2012, leading to
the coup in March.135
The A.U. and ECOWAS responded promptly to the coup by suspending
Mali’s membership and imposing sanctions.136 The Security Council issued a
press statement on the day of the coup condemning the upset of a
democratically-elected leader137 and, on March 26, issued a presidential statement
in support of regional bodies pursuing solutions to the political and
humanitarian crisis.138
Seeking to take advantage of the post-coup political vacuum, MNLA
joined with Ansar Dine, a militant Islamic rebel group with ties to Al-Qaeda, to
extend its control over northern Mali. Between March 30 and April 1, the
combined forces captured key cities in three northern states, culminating in a
declaration of independence from Mali on April 6.139 MNLA, Ansar Dine and
various other Islamist groups140 imposed a strict form of sharia law over its
controlled territories in northern Mali and committed crimes against humanity
and war crimes against civilians, including extrajudicial and arbitrary killings,
torture, amputations, rape and other sexual violence, the recruitment of child
soldiers, and “pillaging of hospitals, schools, aid agencies, and government
buildings.”141 By April 2012, 107,000 Malians had been internally displaced and
177,000 had fled to neighboring countries as refugees.142
On July 3, 2012, the Human Rights Council condemned the human rights
violations committed by MNLA and terrorist groups in northern Mali.143 Just
135
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two days later, the Security Council adopted its own resolution condemning the
violence and expressing support for ECOWAS and the A.U.’s political
resolution efforts.144 In September 2012, ECOWAS formally requested Security
Council authorization for the deployment of a stabilization force in Mali,145 and,
in November 2012, the Secretary-General released a report on the deteriorating
situation in Mali in which he also recommended a peacekeeping force to
“support the [Malian] authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the
population.”146 In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 2085,
authorizing the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in
Mali (AFISMA).147 The resolution reemphasized the Malian government’s Pillar
I responsibility to protect civilians, which had been invoked for the first time
two months earlier, and further granted full authorization to AFISMA to take
“all necessary measures” to “support the Malian authorities in their primary
responsibility to protect the population.”148
Before AFISMA could deploy, the security situation in Mali took a turn for
the worse. Ansar Dine pushed south to capture a strategic area close to the seat
of the Malian transitional government, leading the transitional authorities to
request urgent assistance from French troops on January 10, 2013.149 The same
day, the Security Council issued a press statement urging the rapid deployment
of AFISMA and calling on “Member States to assist the settlement of the crisis
in Mali.”150 In accordance with international law,151 France responded to the
request of the Malian transitional authorities on January 11 and agreed to carry
out airstrikes, which it then launched over a period of four days at the end of
January, successfully driving rebel and terrorist groups out of strategic cities in
northern Mali and restoring territorial control to the Malian government.152
In March 2013, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that
members of Mali’s military were targeting Tuareg and Arab civilians for reprisals
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and that these groups were at risk of mass atrocity crimes,153 adding to concerns
raised in earlier civil society reports that the Malian military might be
perpetrating atrocities against civilians.154 At the same time, the Malian
transitional authorities,155 the A.U. Peace and Security Council,156 and
ECOWAS157 urgently requested a U.N. stabilization mission to help enforce
peacekeeping under the transitional government.158
In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 2100 on April 25,
2013, establishing the Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA).159 MINUSMA had a rare peace enforcement—rather than
peacekeeping—mandate, which authorized its 11,200 military personnel and
1,440 police personnel to use all necessary means “to protect, without prejudice
to the responsibility of the transitional authorities of Mali, civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence.”160 Resolution 2100 also reemphasized
Mali’s Pillar I responsibility to protect its civilian population.161 MINUSMA was
renewed most recently on June 29, 2017,162 and has continued to operate in Mali,
with support from French troops, to assist the political conflict resolution
process being mediated by the A.U. and ECOWAS.163
While political stability and security in Mali remain elusive,164 Security
Council invocation and implementation of R2P was successful in preventing an
escalation to mass atrocity crimes.165 After Mali requested assistance from the

153
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U.N. and French troops to protect against rebel groups, the Security Council
issued a supportive press statement of the French troops that were deployed the
following day. Further, regional authorities were actively involved in attempting
to mitigate the crisis. The A.U. and ECOWAS responded within one week of
the coup, and throughout the crisis the Security Council continued to explicitly
endorse the A.U. and ECOWAS’s political and diplomatic efforts. Additionally,
both AFISMA and MINUSMA were authorized by the Security Council in line
with ECOWAS’s formal requests to deploy U.N. troops to Mali to protect and
stabilize the situation on the ground. Finally, the Security Council had rapid
response capacity in the form of French military assistance, which was able to be
deployed the day following the request by the Malian transitional government to
protect civilians and aid its fight against rebel groups. Through its engagement
with the conflict in Mali, the Security Council demonstrated strong leadership in
implementing R2P in a timely, decisive, and broad manner. With all three
conditions met, the Security Council was able to implement and execute its
responsibility to protect successfully, helping prevent atrocity crimes from being
committed against the Malian people.
***
By examining these three country-specific cases, it is apparent that a lack of
government obstruction—or the ability to overcome government obstruction
through the political will of a P5-member state—as well as cooperation between
regional authorities and the Security Council and a rapid response capacity, are
vitally important for a successful R2P intervention in the face of mass atrocity
crimes.
Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya demonstrate the varying degrees to which
government obstruction may play out in the face of an R2P crisis. In Mali, the
sitting government requested intervention from French troops and U.N.
assistance to deal with the crisis, meaning the Malian transitional government
actively welcomed international assistance. Both Côte d’Ivoire and Libya
demonstrate the Security Council’s actions when faced with obstruction. While
the illegitimate government in Côte d’Ivoire resisted international intervention,
the legitimate and democratically-elected president welcomed assistance from
the Security Council, similar to the situation in Mali. Libya presented a different
set of issues, however, as Qaddafi opposed and obstructed outside assistance as
he actively perpetrated atrocity crimes against his own people. There, interest
from the U.S., U.K., and France provided political will and military possibility to
act even in the face of Qaddafi’s obstruction. Therefore, government
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obstruction in all three R2P success cases was either absent or overcome
through P5-level interest.
Further, these cases demonstrated the vital importance of cooperation
between regional organizations and the Security Council to determine the best
R2P response given the nature of the crisis in each country. In Côte d’Ivoire and
Mali, the A.U. and ECOWAS acted efficiently and effectively to condemn the
outbreak of violence and atrocity crimes. ECOWAS was particularly active,
calling on the Security Council to authorize or strengthen U.N. missions to help
protect civilians in affected states. In Libya, the regional GCC and League of
Arab States played a major role in requesting the U.N. to authorize a protective
no-fly zone. Taking into account various sources of input—such as civil society,
the Security Council itself, and the Human Rights Council—the Security
Council’s subsequent resolutions were supportive of regional organizations and
in line with their recommendations. Importantly, the Security Council seized and
maintained its leadership role as the international body to implement R2P action
while authorizing missions and deploying resources in line with the
recommendations of regional authorities.
Finally, all three cases illustrate the importance of a rapid response capacity
for the Security Council to act timely and decisively in the face of humanitarian
crises. In Côte d’Ivoire, the U.N. had a mission on the ground with which the
Security Council could engage by expanding and strengthening its mandate. In
the case of Mali, and Libya, the military capacity came from particular member
states or a coalition of member states. In all cases, rapid response capacity
existed so that troops and resources could be deployed almost immediately
following the Security Council decision.
Taken together, the existence of all three conditions led the Security
Council to implement its R2P mandate in a timely and decisive manner, as is
required by the principle. Their timely and decisive authorization of R2P
missions was successful in that it protected civilian populations from imminent
or ongoing mass atrocity crimes.

B. U.N. Security Council’s Unsuccessful Implementation of
R2P
Employing the same three conditions used in evaluating the Security
Council’s successful R2P implementation in Subsection A—(1) the level of
government obstruction and the political will of a P5 country to overcome
government obstruction; (2) the cooperation between regional organizations and
the Security Council; and (3) the rapid response capacity to stop mass atrocity
crimes—also provides insight into unsuccessful R2P implementation. As the
four case studies in this Section illustrate, one or two missing conditions are
sufficient to prevent successful implementation of R2P by the Security Council.
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While different conditions are missing in each unsuccessful country-case study,
one thing is clear: all three conditions are necessary for successful R2P
implementation and the absence of a factor impedes the Security Council’s
ability to implement its R2P mandate.

1. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
The ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) traces
back to the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when Hutu exgenocidaires crossed the border from Rwanda to the DRC.166 These extremists
formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and
incited conflict that lasted over a decade and eventually encompassed the
Congolese armed forces as well as the armed forces of Uganda and Rwanda,
leading to regional instability and security risks.167 During this time, the Security
Council established the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUC) in 1999 with a mandate to monitor and assist with a
ceasefire agreement and ensure “the protection of human rights.”168
However, various peace accords and ceasefire agreements failed to produce
political stability, and violence continued throughout the 2000s, driven by ethnic
disparities, religious motives, and natural resource competition. Besides fighting
the FDLR, the Congolese armed forces also faced opposition from numerous
other rebel and insurgent groups.169 Other groups were backed or comprised of
Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces and were committing war crimes in the
DRC. 170 In addition to conflicts stemming from ethnic violence, competition for
valuable natural resources like gold led to extensive human rights abuses as rebel
groups, neighboring countries, and corporations fought to control valuable
mines and important trade routes.171 A report by the Office of the U.N. High
166

Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICRTOP, at ¶ 1, https://perma.cc/NNG2-X5EM (last
visited Nov. 3, 2017).

167

Id.

168

S.C. Res. 1279, ¶ 5(e) (Nov. 30, 1999).

169

The Congolese forces were fighting a broad range of groups, including M23, the Maï-Maï Sheka
(a group formed in 2009 to help businessmen protect their natural mineral exploitation), the
Allied Democratic Forces (a group with links to terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda and AlShabaab), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (a group led by the infamous Joseph Kony and actively
recruiting child soldiers). See Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, at ¶¶ 8–11.

170

Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (OHCHR), Democratic Republic of the Congo,
1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, 259 (Aug. 2010),
https://perma.cc/6SEG-LB2C [hereinafter DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations].

171

See, for example, The Curse of Gold, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 1, 2005), https://perma.cc/EN64N7BT.
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Commissioner on Human Rights later determined that the “systematic and
widespread attacks . . . could be characterized as crimes of genocide” and may
constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes.172
Throughout the 2000s, the Congolese armed forces focused primarily on
their fight against M23, a group comprised of ethnic Tutsis and backed by the
Rwandan government.173 This narrow focus on M23 allowed other rebel and
insurgent groups to commit atrocities with impunity.174 In July 2003, the Security
Council attempted to stem the violence with Resolution 1493, which
strengthened MONUC’s mandate by permitting “all necessary measures” to
“protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical
violence.”175 The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on rebel militias.176
Even after the deployment of MONUC in 2003, political stability remained
elusive and violence continued. The ICC opened an investigation into war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC in June 2004.177 In
January 2006, an attack by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) killed eight
MONUC peacekeepers.178 Four days after the attack, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1653, condemning the attack, reiterating calls for
demobilization of all armed rebel groups, and invoking the DRC’s Pillar I
obligation to protect its citizens by underscoring that the “government in the
region have a primary responsibility to protect their populations, including from
attacks by militias and armed groups.”179 Resolution 1653 marked the Security
Council’s support for the principle of R2P four months after its adoption at the
2005 World Summit. During the open debate preceding the adoption of
Resolution 1653, the U.K., France, and four other speakers addressed the DRC’s
Pillar I responsibilities under R2P, while some went further to call on the
Security Council and international community to intervene to meet their R2P

172

DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations, supra note 170, at 31, 463–64.

173

Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, ¶ 12; see DRC: Mapping Human Rights
Violations, supra note 170, at ¶ 48.

174

Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, at ¶¶ 8–11.

175

S.C. Res. 1493, ¶¶ 25–26 (July 28, 2013).

176

Id. at ¶ 20. For further discussion of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo’s (MONUC) operation and its escalation during the period from 1999 to 2006, see
Anthony W. Gambino, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 360–63.

177

See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04 (June 2004),
https://perma.cc/5S5X-DV2B.

178

U.N. Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Secretary-General on the Democratic
Republic of Congo (Jan. 23, 2006), https://perma.cc/N57D-22P5.

179

S.C. Res. 1653, ¶ 8–10 (Jan. 27, 2006).
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obligations.180
Violence spiked again to dangerous levels in 2008. As Congolese armed
forces intensified military operations and the LRA retaliated, forces on both
sides “killed more than 1500 civilians, raped thousands of women and girls,
abducted hundreds of adults and children, and burned to the ground thousands
of homes, sometimes entire villages.”181 A massacre of 150 civilians killed in
twenty-four hours in eastern Congo with a contingent of U.N. peacekeepers
stationed less than a mile away shed renewed light on MONUC’s lack of
resources and poor communication capabilities.182 The extent of wartime rape
and sexual abuse was also brought to light, with the U.N. reporting 15,000 acts
of rape perpetrated by Congolese soldiers and rebel groups annually in both
2008 and 2009.183 After a visit to the DRC in early 2010, the U.N. Special
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict stated that that the DRC had
become “the rape capital of the world” as perpetrators continued to rape women
and girls with impunity.184 By 2008, the International Rescue Committee

180

See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5359th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5359 (Jan. 27, 2006). Mr. Burian
for Slovakia, then a member of the Council, explained: “[W]e agree that the primary responsibility
to protect lies with Governments. . . . However, it is the responsibility of the international
community to help and protect the most vulnerable if the national authorities are not able to cope
with the magnitude of the problem.” Id. Ms. Loj for Denmark, then a member of the Council,
stated: “We should like to stress that governments in the region have the primary responsibility to
protect their populations.” Id. at 20. The U.K., a P5 member of the Council, stated: “We urge
those Governments to work together, and to work with the United Nations, to take the steps
necessary to better protect their own civilians . . . The international community has an important
supportive part to play.” Id. at 30.
See also U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess. 5359th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5359 (Resumption 1) (Jan. 27,
2006). Ms. Leahy for Canada, then a non-member of the Council, stated: “This debate is
essentially an appeal to the leaders of countries to fulfil their responsibility to protect their
populations.” Id. Mr. Lovald on behalf of Norway, then a member of the Council, stated: “The
Government of Norway acknowledges the fact that the responsibility to protect all Ugandan
citizens lies with the [Ugandan government]” but urged the Security Council to act, as the LRA
represents a threat to regional peace and security. Id. at 46.

181

DR Congo: Massive Increase in Attacks on Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 2, 2009),
https://perma.cc/6TQS-MUD7. LRA was actively operating by killing and abducting civilians.
See The Christmas Massacres: LRA attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 16,
2009), https://perma.cc/W3ZM-24DT.

182

Lydia Polgreen, A Massacre in Congo, Despite Nearby Support, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/world/africa/11congo.html.

183

Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Officials Say 500 Were Victims of Congo Rapes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/world/africa/08nations.html; see also Atrocities Beyond
Words: A Barbarous Campaign of Rape, ECONOMIST (May 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/S2NM-LB82.

184

Tackling Sexual Violence Must Include Prevention, Ending Impunity—U.N. Official, U.N. NEWS CENTRE
(Apr. 27, 2010), https://perma.cc/2G4V-CARW.
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reported that 5.4 million people had died since the start of the conflict in 1998,
with 45,000 people continuing to die each month.185
Faced with continuing violence and an ineffective MONUC mission even
as the U.N. continued to increase MONUC troop levels, the Security Council
transformed MONUC into the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with Resolution 1925 in May
2010.186 The Resolution invoked the DRC’s Pillar I responsibility to protect its
civilian population and engaged fully with the Security Council’s Pillar II and III
obligations under R2P by mandating MONUSCO to use “all necessary means”
to “[e]nsure the effective protection of civilians.”187
Even after MONUSCO’s deployment, further reports emerged
demonstrating the extent of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
by all parties in the DRC. In 2012, a U.N. panel of experts substantiated that
both Rwanda and Uganda had armed rebel groups, particularly M23 rebels.188
Human Rights Watch reported that Rwanda was also committing war crimes by
forcibly recruiting men and children to fight for M23.189 As part of its efforts to
assist the Congolese armed forces in their targeted fight against M23, the
Security Council imposed an arms embargo on M23 and FLDR rebels, as well as
a travel ban and assets freeze on two prominent M23 leaders in January 2013.190
The arms embargo was initially ineffective, as Rwanda and Uganda continued to
supply rebel groups with weapons.191 Facing continued sanctions violations, the
U.S., the E.U., and the U.K. cut military aid to Rwanda in October 2013.192
The insufficient resources and support that had plagued MONUC
continued to hinder MONUSCO’s civilian protection mandate. The inefficacy
of MONUSCO was most starkly highlighted in November 2012, when a small
group of M23 rebels captured the city of Goma while the MONUSCO troops
185

Chris McGreal, War in Congo Kills 45,000 People Each Month, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2008),
https://perma.cc/5LYL-DBMH.

186

S.C. Res. 1925, ¶ 1 (May 28, 2010).

187

Id., at pmbl., ¶¶ 11–12.

188

Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, Exclusive: Rwanda, Uganda Arming Congo Rebels, Providing
Troops—U.N. Panel, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/Z5YY-49Z7.

189

DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2012),
https://perma.cc/X2YU-49H8.

190

Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, at ¶ 1124.

191

Id.

192

David Smith, U.S. Blocks Military Aid to Rwanda Over Alleged Backing of M23 Child Soldiers, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/23N9-34PC; Nicholas Kulish, After Outside Pressure,
Rebels in Congo Lay Down Their Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/world/africa/m23-rebels-democratic-republiccongo.html.
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stood by, unable to engage, because the MONSCUO mandate did not permit
affirmative engagement and was limited to supporting the Congolese armed
forces, which were absent in Goma.193 As a result of this unacceptable loss and
responding to requests from the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC),194 the Security Council unanimously authorized the first Intervention
Brigade in March 2013 with Resolution 2098.195 The Intervention Brigade within
MONUSCO was uniquely endowed with offensive capabilities to help execute
MONUSCO’s “all necessary measures” civilian protection mandate, including
“contain[ing] threats to civilians before, during and after any military
intervention.”196 This unprecedented mandate substantially increased
MONUSCO’s ability to pursue its task of civilian protection and was a crucial
factor in helping the Congolese armed forces to defeat the M23 rebel group by
November 2013.197
Fighting in the DRC continues today, as does the perpetration of mass
atrocity crimes against the civilian population.198 With the effective elimination
of M23, the DRC and the Congolese armed forces have turned to the remaining
rebel groups to attempt to bring stability to all parts of the country.199 The
Security Council has extended MONUSCO’s mandate several times, most
recently until March 2018, reaffirming its civilian protection mandate under “all
necessary measures.”200 Resolutions continue to demonstrate the Security
Council’s full engagement with its R2P responsibilities while reminding the DRC
of its Pillar I responsibility to protect its civilian population. The Security
Council has also employed other tools, such as continuing to impose sanctions
on individuals “planning, directing or committing acts in the DRC that

193

David Lewis & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Defends Failed Attempt to Halt Capture of Congo’s Goma,
CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 21, 2012), https://perma.cc/MG6Q-948R.
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Both the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African
Development Community supported a more proactive approach by the U.N. Security Council. See
S.C. Res. 2098, pmbl. (Mar. 28, 2013) (“Taking note of the special report of the Secretary-General
(S/2013/119) on the DRC and the Great Lakes Region and of its recommendations contained
therein, including regarding the establishment of an ‘Intervention Brigade’ within MONUSCO, based on the
idea initially conceived by the ICGLR and supported by SADC.”) (emphasis added).
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Id. at ¶ 9.
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Id. at ¶ 12(a); see also Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, at ¶ 28.

197

DR Congo’s M23 Rebel Chief Sultani Makenga ‘Surrenders’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://perma.cc/G7NE-Q53Z; Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, at ¶ 27.
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INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, A TOOLKIT ON THE RESPONSIBILITY
PROTECT 25, https://perma.cc/P3UW-Q9H2 (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
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Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 166, at ¶ 36.
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S.C. Res. 2348, ¶ 33 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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constitute human rights violations.”201
Aspects of the Security Council’s engagement with the crisis in the DRC
demonstrate the potential of R2P to protect civilians and stop mass atrocity
crimes. The regionally-proposed and supported Intervention Brigade, which was
unanimously deployed by the Security Council, had the offensive capabilities to
pursue MONUSCO’s civilian protection mandate and effectively use force to
stop atrocity crimes. The Intervention Brigade was instrumental in providing the
Security Council with the rapid response capacity necessary to stop the
operations of the M23 rebel group, a group that had perpetrated extensive
atrocity crimes against civilian communities.
For the most part, however, Security Council engagement with the crisis in
the DRC has fallen short of protecting millions of civilians from mass atrocity
crimes over the past two decades. While government obstruction itself was
absent in that the U.N. mission worked closely with the Congolese armed forces
to protect civilians, the remaining two conditions hindered a successful
implementation of R2P. First, countries in the region not only failed to
cooperate with the Security Council, but were actively engaged in perpetrating
mass atrocity crimes. Rwanda and Uganda both funded and provided soldiers
for rebel groups operating in the DRC, thereby actively helping perpetrate those
crimes. Second, the Security Council had an extremely delayed effective response
to the crisis. Neither MONUC nor MONUSCO was able to effectively fulfill its
civilian protection mandate, lacking capacity, resources, and staffing that
continuously undermined the mission. Both U.N. missions failed to provide the
Security Council with a rapid response capacity as atrocity crimes were being
committed. The combination of these conditions led to the languishing of the
crisis in the DRC for over two decades and a distinct failure by the Security
Council to successfully implement R2P to protect millions of civilians from mass
atrocity crimes.

2. Sudan
The protracted and ongoing humanitarian crises in Sudan’s war-torn
regions of Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan have their roots in civil
conflict over land resources that began in the 1970s and evolved along ethnic
lines in the 1980s with the radicalization of Arab groups and marginalization of
non-Arab groups. Over the course of four decades, a convergence of man-made
conflict and natural phenomena created a political, economic, and social climate

201

The U.N. sanctions regime against the DRC and rebel groups was recently renewed, see S.C. Res.
2360, ¶ 1 (June 21, 2017). For sanctionable actions, see S.C. Res. 2293, ¶ 7(e) (June 23, 2016).
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in Sudan that led to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur in 2003 and the crisis in
Blue Nile and South Kordofan in 2005.202
a) Darfur
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, extended periods of drought and
increasing desertification created tensions between non-Arab farmers (including
the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups) and nomadic Arab groups who
grazed cattle, which eventually erupted into violence in 1987.203 By the time Arab
leader Omar al-Bashir rose to power through a coup in 1989,204 the battle lines
between Arab and non-Arab groups had been drawn—and would shape the
humanitarian crises to come.205 The government actively pursued policies that
favored Arab groups, because al-Bashir relied on Arab networks throughout the
country to remain in power.206 As al-Bashir politically marginalized non-Arab
groups, local conflict increased and Arab militias began attacking non-Arab
villages during the late 1990s.207 The government began recruiting from radical
Arab groups within Sudan and neighboring Libya to further build up the
Janjaweed militias so they could fight alongside the government’s Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF).208 In response, rebel forces composed largely of the Fur
and Zaghawa ethnic groups formed the Sudanese Liberation
Movement/Army209 (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
Throughout 2002 and 2003, SLM/A and JEM staged increasingly successful
attacks against the SAF, placing the government in the precarious position of
being unable to exert military control over parts of North, West, and South
Darfur.210
In retaliation, the government began to systematically and indiscriminately
attack non-Arab villages, engaging in mass atrocity crimes that reached their

202

This section will discuss Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan as mass atrocity crimes occurred
during conflicts in these regions. This paper will not discuss the conflicts in the Adyei Area,
Eastern Sudan, or the 2013 Khartoum protests because, while human rights violations occurred,
the conflicts did not reach the level of R2P concerns.
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The Crisis in Darfur, ICRTOP, at § II, https://perma.cc/P5QX-CCS7 (last visited Nov. 3, 2017);
Andrew S. Natsios & Zachary Scott, Darfur, Sudan, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE
PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME, supra note 6, at 237–38.
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The Crisis in Darfur, supra note 203, at § II.
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Id.
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Natsios & Scott, supra note 203, at 239; The Crisis in Darfur, supra note 203, at § II.
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This was the Masalit-Arab War of 1996-1999. See Natsios & Scott, supra note 203, at 239.
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Natsios & Scott, supra note 203, at 240.
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The SLM/A initially started as the Darfur Liberation Front. See id. at 240.
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The Crisis in Darfur, supra note 203, at § IV.
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height from September 2003 to April 2004.211 The SAF, in conjunction with the
Janjaweed militias, engaged in systematic violence against civilians including
mass executions, rape and other sexual violence, child abduction, looting of
herds, destruction of civilian property, and the burning of fields and villages.212
Government forces carried out indiscriminate aerial bombings while the
Janjaweed militias would attack from the ground, killing those that attempted to
escape and burning villages after looting.213 The government’s policy of
indiscriminate civilian attacks during this time is estimated to have led to 300,000
civilian deaths, 2.7 million IDPs, and 250,000 refugees.214
Humanitarian aid organizations and the U.S. government began reporting
on the commission of mass atrocity crimes and documenting the devastating
impact on civilians in mid-2003.215 In August 2004, the A.U. was the first
international organization to intervene, deploying a mission (AMIS) to monitor a
recent ceasefire agreement.216 The A.U. expressed some hostility towards a
potential intervention by non-African countries and various leaders stated that
211

Natsios & Scott, supra note 203, at 241.

212

Id.

213

Id.; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Sudan (Darfur), in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE
AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 347; see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
& LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. ARCHIVE Pub. No. 11182, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR
(Sept. 2004), https://perma.cc/AZJ3-CFCJ [hereinafter DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR]
for testimonies from refugees of aerial attacks. Attacks on villages began with government aerial
attack, followed by government soldiers and Janjaweed militiamen entering villages, with fleeing
villagers targeted by aerial bombing and foot soldiers looting villages after civilians had fled.
Multiple attacks over many months often occurred before the village was destroyed through
burning or bombing.

214

The Crisis in Darfur, supra note 203, at § IV.

215

See generally Amnesty Int’l, The Looming Crisis in Darfur, AI Index AFR 54/041/2003 (June 30,
2003); The Other War in Sudan: A Call for High Level Observer in Western Sudan Peace Process,
RELIEFWEB (Dec. 10, 2003), https://perma.cc/5KLR-EA8E; Darfur in Flame: Atrocities in Western
Sudan, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH no. 5(A) (Apr. 2004), https://perma.cc/G27S-MP4G; Darfur
Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May
6, 2004), https://perma.cc/GRN6-CZS9. The U.S. Department of State also released information
in April 2004. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.
ARCHIVE, Fact Sheet, SUDAN: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN DARFUR (Apr. 27, 2004),
https://perma.cc/7UMT-32RD; DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR, supra note 213.
Congress was briefed on the atrocities in Darfur in June 2004. See generally TED DAGNE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS21862, SUDAN: THE CRISIS IN DARFUR (June 16, 2004).

216

See Permanent Rep. of Nigeria to the U.N., Letter dated 27 July 2004 from the Permanent
Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/603 (July 27, 2004). The U.N. endorsed the mission. See S.C. Res.
1556, 1 (July 30, 2004). Natsios and Scott argue that international humanitarian intervention came
after the bulk of the killing had already occurred and was a case of too little too late. See Natsios &
Scott, supra note 203, at 254. The African Union and the League of Arab states denied that
genocide or ethnic cleansing was occurring. See id., at ¶ 9.
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the situation in Darfur was an “African responsibility” to be dealt with by
African countries,217 even as AMIS faced an uncooperative Sudanese
government and a severe lack of mission resources.218 The League of Arab States
also opposed any Western-led intervention in Sudan for similar reasons.219
Following a closed-door briefing by leading NGOs and the Deputy
Permanent Representative of the Sudan regarding the deteriorating situation in
Darfur,220 the Security Council issued its first presidential statement regarding
the humanitarian crisis in Darfur on May 25, 2004, calling on parties to protect
civilians and cease hostilities.221 In July 2004, the Security Council imposed an
arms embargo on all non-state actors operating in Darfur, including the
Janjaweed militias.222 Several months later, the Security Council requested the
establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate possible acts of genocide
in Darfur—marking the first time a U.N. inquiry would be established for this
purpose.223 The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur released its
report to the Secretary-General in January 2005.224 The report concluded that
while “no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented” by the Sudanese
government, evidence of “crimes against humanity and war crimes that have
been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.”225
The same month, the Sudanese government signed the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), ending the long-running civil war between the Sudanese
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Susan E. Rice, Why Darfur Can’t be Left to Africa, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2005),
https://perma.cc/69YH-SHZS.
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See Raji Rafiu Boye, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Darfur: A Critical Analysis of UN-AU
Hybridization Mechanism, 11 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 1052, 1065 (2014); AMIS II-E Performance
Assessment, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2006), https://perma.cc/347V-9QWC.
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government and rebel groups in southern Sudan, but leaving the conflict in
Darfur unresolved.226
In March 2005, the Security Council authorized a U.N. mission (UNMIS)
to support the implementation of the CPA and “coordinate international efforts
towards the protection of civilians,” instructing it also to work closely with
AMIS “with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace
in Darfur.”227 However, UNMIS never deployed because of the Sudanese
government’s opposition to a humanitarian mission led solely by the U.N.228
In March 2005, the Security Council also voted to refer the situation in
Darfur to the ICC for investigation into acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.229 This move demonstrated the Security Council’s
commitment to pursuing accountability measures at the same time that it was
supporting the peace process through UNMIS. In a letter to the Security
Council, the A.U. welcomed the ICC referral and also called for a
transformation of the A.U.-led AMIS to a U.N.-led mission, signaling a change
in position for allowing non-African intervention.230 In August 2006, the Security
Council reframed UNMIS’s civilian protection mandate in terms of the recently
adopted R2P doctrine by applying paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document to Darfur—the first country-specific application
of R2P.231
In May 2006, the Sudanese government and one faction of the SLM/A
signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), but the agreement failed to receive
the endorsement of all rebel groups, with the JEM and another faction of the
SLM/A opposing it.232 Conflict and violence towards civilians continued as rebel
groups splintered into various factions and the Sudanese government failed to
sign a comprehensive peace agreement with all rebel groups.

226

The CPA included a timetable for a referendum for various southern states, including the states
that would vote for South Sudanese independence in 2011. See Section III(B)(2)(a), infra,
discussing South Sudanese civil war and R2P concerns starting in 2013.
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note 14, at ¶ 5 (looking forward to deployment of UNMIS and inviting the consent of the
Sudanese government).

229
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abstentions—U.S., China, Brazil, Algeria).
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Permanent Rep. of Congo, Letter dated 10 March 2006 from the Permanent Representative of
the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 1,
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As the number of civilian deaths and displaced persons continued to rise,
the European Parliament urged the U.N. in 2006 to “act on its responsibility to
protect civilians” considering that Sudan had failed under its Pillar I
responsibility of protecting its own citizens.233 Calls by the European Parliament
for the Security Council to take on its R2P responsibilities continued up until
July 2007,234 when the Security Council voted to merge UNMIS and AMIS into a
joint U.N.-A.U. mission (UNAMID).235 UNAMID was meant to better
implement peacekeeping measures as AMIS lacked the resources to complete its
mandate236 and AMIS was subject to constant opposition by the Sudanese
government.237
In 2009 and 2010, the ICC issued arrest warrants for al-Bashir based on
three counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and two
counts of war crimes.238 The Sudanese government, the League of Arab States,
and the A.U. denounced the warrants issued for acts of genocide and the A.U.
specifically called on the Security Council to defer proceedings under Article 16
of the 2005 Rome Statute.239 While the 2005 referral to the ICC and the
subsequent 2009/2010 arrest warrants sent a strong message of accountability
for architects of mass atrocity crimes, to this day, the Security Council has done
233

Resolution on Darfur, ¶ 2, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2006)0142 (2006); Resolution on the
Situation in Darfur, ¶ 3, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2007)0052 (2007) [hereinafter European
Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Darfur].
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Resolution on the Situation in Darfur, supra note 233, at ¶ 1; Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the
Situation in Darfur, ¶ 1, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2007)0342 (2007).
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S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 6 (July 31, 2007).
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AMIS II-E Performance Assessment, supra note 218 (“The AMIS mission up to early 2005 was beset
by shortcomings in deployment footprint, troop strength, support to humanitarian organizations,
protection of civilians, training, staff planning, rules of engagement, priority of tasks, mobility,
communications, logistics, and collaboration with CivPol.”).
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S.C. Res. 1769, supra note 235, at ¶ 2; The Crisis in Darfur, supra note 203, at § IV(i).
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Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, Warrant of Arrest, at 3 (July 12, 2010)
(including genocide by killing, by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and by deliberately
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction); Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009) (arresting for counts “for
genocide by killing, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and genocide by
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction”).
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African Union, Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal
Court, Assembly of the African Union 16th Ordinary Session, ¶ 3, Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII) (Jan.
2011) (requesting U.N. Security Council defer the proceedings in accordance with Article 16 of
the Rome Statute of the ICC); see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (Sept. 28, 1998) (“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”);
The Crisis in Darfur, supra note 203, at § IV(iv).
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little to compel the international community to comply with the warrants to put
an end to impunity for al-Bashir.240
In January 2011, the Sudanese Government and an umbrella organization
of rebel forces known as the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) signed the
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), which proposed a power-sharing
arrangement.241 The DDPD proved difficult to implement, however, as rebel
groups continued to splinter, with some adhering to the peace agreement while
others continued to fight. In April 2013, more rebel groups signed onto the
DDPD, but hopes of peace in Darfur were dashed when fighting in a
neighboring state242 spilled over into South Darfur and threatened IDP camps,
leading to a new surge of violence.243 Renewed violence involved a similar
pattern of atrocities as before, with government forces and militias engaging in
war crimes and crimes against humanity against the non-Arab civilian
population.244 Amnesty International reported that the Sudanese government
used chemical weapons against civilian villages throughout 2016 as part of its
scorched earth campaign to decimate rebel strongholds in Darfur.245 In 2016,
these clashes in North Darfur further displaced 129,000 civilians, leading to a
total of 2.1 million IDPs in the Darfur region.246 Darfur remains one of the
deadliest conflict zones in the world for peacekeepers, as more than 70 U.N.
peacekeepers have been killed there since 2008.247 Even as conflicts between
government forces and rebel groups have decreased in recent years,248 armed
militias continue to attack IDPs and civilians. Fighting continues to this day as
the political peace process continues to be stalled and comprehensive peace
agreements remain elusive.
240

U.N. Meeting Coverage, Security Council, 7833rd mtg., Impunity Will Thrive without Break in
Impasse over Darfur Situation, Chief Prosecutor of International Criminal Court Warns Security
Council, SC/12623 (Dec. 13, 2016).
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Arrive, RADIO DABANGA (Feb. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/5QBB-JGFS.
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See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "MEN WITH NO MERCY" RAPID SUPPORT FORCES ATTACKS
AGAINST CIVILIANS IN DARFUR, SUDAN (Sept. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/DNF3-NQX6.
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Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jevel Marra,
Darfur, AI Index AFR 54/4877/2016 (Sept. 29, 2016).

246

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Sudan, 32 R2P MONITOR 7, 8 (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://perma.cc/2RMR-PXN7; see also Rice, supra note 217.
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Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Sudan, supra note 246.
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U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid
Operation in Darfur, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2017/250 (Mar. 23, 2017) (concluding that fighting between
government and rebel groups has decreased, several further peace agreements with rebel factions
have been signed, and fewer intercommunal clashes have occurred).
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The Security Council’s involvement in Darfur led to several significant
“firsts”: the first country-specific invocation of the R2P doctrine, the first
commission established to investigate genocide, and the first ICC referral for
criminal investigation into genocide, which led to the first ICC arrest warrant for
a sitting head of state. From 2004 to 2006, the Security Council employed
various tools to attempt to stop the mass atrocity crimes being committed
against civilians under its newly emerging R2P responsibilities.
However, the crisis in Darfur is largely a story of too little too late. Despite
engaging in its responsibility to protect civilians through numerous avenues, the
Security Council largely failed to curb the extensive humanitarian crisis in
Darfur. The slow response of the Security Council was compounded by the
Sudanese government’s perpetration of human rights abuses against its own
people and its active obstruction of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions.
While the failure to initiate a timely response rests partially with the Security
Council, the Sudanese government’s active obstruction of the peacekeeping
missions before and during their deployment exacerbated the humanitarian
crisis. The Sudanese government resisted the deployment of peacekeeping
troops and has failed to actively engage in comprehensive peace agreements with
rebel groups throughout the country. The Sudanese government has repeatedly
failed to protect its civilian population under Pillar I of R2P and has obstructed
the international missions meant to assist in the protection of civilians under
Pillars II and III. In the face of the obstruction by the Sudanese government, no
P5-level country put forth the political will to push for the necessary R2P
response in Sudan to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.
Further, the Security Council lacked rapid response capacity. With the
majority of civilian mass atrocity crimes committed by government forces and
Janjaweed militias occurring in 2003 and early 2004, the engagement of the
Security Council in mid-2004 came too late. The deployment of peacekeeping
troops was far from the rapid response that was necessary to stop the conflict,
with UNMIS troops not even authorized until March 2005 or deployed until
Spring 2006. Part of this delay can be attributed to the third condition: the
hesitancy of African leaders and regional authorities to permit intervention by
non-African countries. The A.U., the League of Arab States, and influential
African leaders stated for years that the crisis in Darfur was Africa’s
responsibility. While the hesitancy to allow Western-led intervention was
historically and politically understandable, this position was particularly
detrimental on humanitarian grounds given that the A.U. mission lacked the
funding and resources to carry out necessary operations to protect civilians.
While the Security Council has engaged with its R2P responsibilities
through investigations, deployment of peacekeepers with a civilian protection
mandate, an arms embargo, and an ICC referral, the Council response does not
have the regional support nor rapid response capacity necessary to successfully
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implement R2P in the face of a conflict that has dragged on for over a decade
and killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in the process.
b) Blue Nile & South Kordofan
Following South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011, violence erupted
between government and rebel forces in the states of Blue Nile and South
Kordofan—the new southern border between Sudan and nascent South
Sudan.249 Tensions had escalated for various reasons: communities in these states
faced political marginalization due to lack of adequate representation within the
Sudanese government, social marginalization due to differences of ethnic and
religious identities between Blue Nile and South Kordofan groups and others in
Sudan, and economic grievances due to higher taxation of these oil-rich regions
without fair compensation.250 Tensions escalated further when the Sudanese
government ignored the provision of the 2005 CPA that provided for a January
2011 independence vote for Blue Nile and South Kordofan states—similar to
the provision that had led to the independence vote for South Sudan.
One month prior to South Sudan’s formal secession in July 2011, these
long-simmering tensions erupted into violence when a candidate from the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)251 stood to lose a local South
Kordofan election against a pro-government opponent.252 Localized violence
quickly spread throughout South Kordofan and into neighboring Blue Nile by
September. In response to the surge of violence between government and rebel
forces, the SPLM-N, and various Darfur rebel factions joined forces to form the
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance committed to overthrowing the alBashir government.253
Reacting with disproportionate violence to the formation of the SRF, the
government began carrying out indiscriminate bombing campaigns against
villages that resulted in “deaths and injuries to civilians and the destruction of
homes, crops, livestock and other civilian objects.”254 The SAF launched
particularly atrocious attacks against communities in South Kordofan’s Nuba
Mountain region, which the Sudanese government believed were assisting rebel
249

Both states had believed they would form part of South Sudan with the 2011 secession but were
used as a bargaining chip to remain part of Sudan, much to the dismay of citizens.
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The Crisis in Sudan, ICRTOP, at § II, https://perma.cc/S7J7-BU7U (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
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The SPLM-N is a northern affiliate of the SPLM/A, which had been the leading rebel party
pushing for South Sudanese independence and is now the ruling part in South Sudan. See Section
III(b)(3) for an analysis for South Sudan.
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The Crisis in Sudan, supra note 250, at § II.
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Id. (noting that rebel groups consolidated include SPLM-N, SLA-MM, and JEM).
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Aristide Nonosi, Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, ¶ 58, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/33/65 (July 28, 2016); see also The Crisis in Sudan, supra note 250.
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forces. Human rights organizations have reported and continue to report that
these and other government attacks likely constitute war crimes and crimes
against humanity as bombing campaigns are indiscriminate against civilians,
sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, and communities continue to be
forcibly displaced through continuous attacks and the destruction of civilian
property and food sources.255 Atrocity crimes perpetrated by SAF against
civilians continue to be exacerbated by the ongoing denial of access for
humanitarian aid organizations into the Nuba Mountains.256 While the Sudanese
government’s restriction on U.N. missions and bodies, humanitarian aid
organizations, and independent groups to the region has led to difficulty in
determining the exact number of people killed and displaced, U.N. agencies
estimate 400,000 IDPs in Blue Nile and South Kordofan257 and 220,000 refugees
in neighboring countries by the end of 2013.258
In August 2016, the Sudanese government and some rebel factions signed
the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) Roadmap
Agreement to end the conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan.259
However, the agreement was breached by both sides in January and February
2017, with violence breaking out again in South Kordofan.260 In January 2017,
the Janjaweed militias and other paramilitary groups were formally integrated
into the SAF and brought under the command of al-Bashir through the Rapid
Support Forces Act.261 With the full backing of the government, the militias have
been given an open mandate to stop inter-ethnic clashes and are being deployed
in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur.262
Since 2011, the SAF has committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity in South Kordofan and Blue Nile through extrajudicial killings, forced
displacement, widespread sexual violence, and “scorched earth” tactics aimed at
255

Sudan: Crisis Conditions in Southern Kordofan, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 4, 2012),
https://perma.cc/2ZVQ-KEQG; Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Five Years and Counting: Intensified Aerial
Bombardment, Ground Offensive and Humanitarian Crisis in South Kordofan State, AI Index AFR
54/4913/2016 (Sept. 29, 2016).
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Anaïs Pagot & Melanie Wissing, Sudan: Other Crises Distract Attention from Tremendous Needs of IDPs,
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. (July 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/CTX2-KHXT.
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Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Civilians Caught in Unending Crisis in Southern Kordofan, AI Index AFR
54/009/2013 (Apr. 17, 2013); Amnesty Int’l, “We Had No Time to Bury Them” War Crimes in Sudan’s
Blue Nile State, AI Index AFR 54/011/2013, at n.5 (June 10, 2013).
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destroying food sources and civilian infrastructure.263 Leading NGOs have
published numerous reports detailing the war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions, invoking
R2P and calling on the international community to engage with Sudan to
prevent further atrocities.264 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights released a report on the situation of human rights in Sudan in August
2011 listing atrocities committed by the SAF, stating these likely constitute war
crimes and crimes against humanity.265
While the conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan falls under
UNAMID’s mandate, UNAMID has been unable to protect civilians because of
the Sudanese government’s obstruction of access to those states.266 UNAMID’s
mandate was extended in June 2017, reiterating Sudan’s Pillar I primary
responsibility to protect its own civilians and prevent human rights abuses as
well as reaffirming UNAMID’s authorization to take all necessary action to
protect civilians.267 In contrast with the Security Council’s delayed response to
Darfur, U.N. peacekeeping forces were already present when violence emerged
in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in 2011 and had an R2P mandate. However,
active obstruction of the U.N. mission and humanitarian aid delivery by the
Sudanese government has prevented the implementation of the R2P mandate,
leading to more civilian deaths and displacement in Sudan.

3. South Sudan
Following a popular referendum in which an overwhelming majority voted
for independence, South Sudan formally seceded from Sudan on July 9, 2011,268
263

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Sudan, supra note 246, at 8. Note that SPLM-N
also committed war crimes due to its indiscriminate attacks on civilian-populated areas,
recruitment of children, and attacks on U.N. personnel. See id.
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a division supported by the Security Council.269 While the world hoped the birth
of a new country would bring peace to the conflict-torn region, peace and
stability remain elusive due to the eruption of ethnic clashes and tensions
between the two major ethnic groups—the majority Dinka peoples, and the
second largest ethnic group, the Nuer—that had previously united in the pursuit
of South Sudanese independence. As part of the agreement of independence,
Salva Kiir from the Dinka community became the first elected president of
South Sudan and his party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) became the ruling party of South Sudan.270 Riek Machar, the previous
leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In-Opposition
(SPLM/A-IO) and member of the Nuer community, became the First Vice
President in the government.271 To help facilitate the transition to independence
and ensure the protection of civilians, the Security Council quickly established
the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)272 and
authorized UNMISS to use “all necessary means” to carry out protection of
civilians alongside its larger nation-building mandate.273
Despite efforts towards stability, civil war broke out in December 2013
along ethnic lines.274 Ethnic tensions erupted into violence as President Kiir
dismissed his entire cabinet for fear of a coup after a political power struggle
split the SPLM/A into factions, igniting both intra-party conflict as well as the
simmering ethnic tensions between the Dinka and Nuer communities.275 As the
conflict between the SPLM/A factions loyal to President Kiir and other
SPLM/A factions and the SPLM/A-IO opposed to President Kiir escalated,
parties engaged in severe human rights violations including the killing of
civilians, the destruction of civilian property, extensive sexual violence, and
recruitment of child soldiers.276
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the
support of the A.U., immediately attempted to negotiate a peace agreement
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between the parties, but to little avail.277 The Security Council renewed the
UNMISS mandate, reaffirming all three pillars of R2P in May 2014.278 In July
2015, the Security Council established a travel ban and froze assets for six
military leaders—three from each side of the conflict—whose “targeting of
civilians” “violate[d] . . . international human rights law or international
humanitarian law.”279 To this day, however, the Security Council has not
imposed further targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights
violations in South Sudan.280
Under increasing pressure from the IGAD, the A.U., and the U.N., the
SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-IO signed an Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015.281 However, peace was
short-lived as intense fighting broke out between the two sides in Juba in July
2016, killing over 300 civilians, including two U.N. peacekeepers, and further
displacing an estimated 42,000 civilians in the span of just four days.282 An
Independent Special Investigation into the effectiveness of UNMISS during the
Juba crisis determined that UNMISS failed to protect civilians and humanitarian
workers under its R2P mandate because of ineffective mission leadership,
underperformance of UNMISS personnel, and lack of preparedness to carry out
its mandate.283 In response to the investigation’s findings, U.N. SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon fired the UNMISS commander and called for UNMISS
reforms to prevent U.N. peacekeepers from abandoning their posts and to
better ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers.284
With violence continuing through the end of 2016, the Security Council
voted to increase UNMISS troop levels through a Regional Protection Force
originally proposed by the IGAD, and to prioritize UNMISS resources towards

277
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278

S.C. Res. 2155, ¶¶ 3, 4 (May 27, 2014) (extending UNMISS mission and authorizing all necessary
means to protect civilians).
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Sanctions List, U.N. Press Release SC/11958 (July 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/7XYH-NDPG
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protection of civilians.285 U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
Adama Dieng warned the international community of a possible escalation
towards genocide if acts of ethnic hatred and targeting of civilians were allowed
to continue.286 The Security Council also considered a draft resolution on
imposing an arms embargo and additional targeted sanctions on SPLM/A and
SPLM/A-IO forces in December 2016; however, the resolution failed due to
abstentions from China, Russia, and six other countries who claimed that the
South Sudanese government was showing promising signs of engagement in the
peace process.287
In March 2017, the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, which
had been established by the Human Rights Council a year earlier,288 submitted its
first report on the human rights situation in South Sudan.289 The Commission’s
report determined that government and opposition forces were targeting
minority ethnic groups for killing, arbitrary arrest and detention, and severe
sexual violence and sexual slavery, and that opposition forces were intentionally
recruiting child soldiers.290 The report concluded that these targeted tactics
amounted to ethnic cleansing.291 The Security Council met on March 23, 2017 to
discuss the report’s findings and the deteriorating situation in South Sudan,
calling on the government to reinstate the August 2015 Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan292 in order to restart
political negotiations and permit the unrestricted access of humanitarian aid

285
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Release (Nov. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/5AR3-UPHP.

287
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organizations to all communities in need.293 While some Security Council
members expressed support for re-opening discussions of further targeted
sanctions, Russia particularly opposed it, indicating a likely veto if a targeted
sanction resolution were pursued.294
As of February 2017, famine was declared in two states in South Sudan,
with aid organizations estimating that 100,000 people are facing starvation and
more than half a million people are on the brink of famine.295 As of March 2017,
South Sudan had become the largest source of displacement on the continent:
1.5 million South Sudanese refugees have fled to surrounding countries, 2
million individuals remain internally displaced, and over 200,000 people are
living in UNMISS civilian protection sites for fear of ethnic killings or sexual
violence.296 The South Sudanese government continues to actively restrict access
to humanitarian aid organizations, particularly to opposition-held areas,
endangering the lives of millions of South Sudanese people in need of
humanitarian relief.297
Even though the Security Council has repeatedly engaged with its R2P
obligations in resolutions creating and extending UNMISS,298 UNMISS has been
unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians. The inability of UNMISS to
carry out its R2P mandate can be attributed to the mission’s lack of capacity as
well as the active obstruction of UNMISS by the South Sudanese government.
With regard to the first point, UNMISS has been hampered by a lack of both
effective leadership299 and mission resources.300 Even though the R2P mandate
has been consistently present, the will and resources to implement the R2P
293
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294

Id.

295

Republic of South Sudan: Current and Projected (January–July 2017) Acute Food Insecurity Situation,
INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY PHASE CLASSIFICATION (2017), https://perma.cc/T2B3-Y4HW.

296

Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 289, at ¶¶ 20, 22; see also
South Sudan: Humanitarian Situation & Response, U.N. OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFF. (Sept. 21 2016), https://perma.cc/DA65-N842.

297

U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., supra note 280; Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South
Sudan, supra note 289, at ¶ 22.

298

S.C. Res. 1996, supra note 272, at ¶¶ 3(b), 4 (creating and permitting UNMISS all necessary means
to protect civilians). Full engagement with R2P has been reaffirmed explicitly in all subsequent
resolutions extending and expanding UNMISS’s mandate. See S.C. Res. 2155, supra note 278, at ¶¶
3, 4; S.C. Res. 2304, supra note 285, at ¶¶ 4, 5; S.C. Res. 2057, ¶¶ 3–5 (July 5, 2012); S.C. Res.
2109, ¶ 4 (July 11, 2013); S.C. Res. 2132, ¶ 2 (Dec. 24, 2013); S.C. Res. 2187, ¶¶ 3, 4(a) (Nov. 25,
2014); S.C. Res. 2223, ¶ 4(a) (May 28, 2015); S.C. Res. 2241, ¶ 4(a) (Oct. 9, 2015); S.C. Res. 2252,
¶ 8(a) (Dec. 15, 2015); S.C. Res. 2302, ¶ 1 (July 29, 2016); S.C. Res. 2326, ¶¶ 1, 2 (Dec. 15, 2016);
S.C. Res. 2327, ¶ 7(a) (Dec. 16, 2016).

299

Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation, supra note 283.

300

U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., supra note 280.

470

Vol. 18 No. 2

The U.N. Security Council’s Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect

Genser

mandate have fallen short. With regard to the second point, not only has the
government of South Sudan blatantly disregarded its own responsibility to
protect its citizens from mass atrocity crimes, but it has itself perpetrated actions
amounting to ethnic cleansing. While the South Sudanese government has begun
accepting UNMISS regional protection forces301—a concession which it has
previously changed its mind about on multiple occasions302—the government
exacerbates the humanitarian crisis by continuing to restrict the freedom of
movement for UNMISS and humanitarian aid organizations, which prevents
essential resources and protective forces from reaching communities in need.
While regional organizations and authorities engaged early with the conflict
in South Sudan, this was to no avail as government obstruction and lack of rapid
response capacity prevented successful implementation of R2P. Both the IGAD
and the A.U. attempted to negotiate a peace agreement immediately following
the outbreak of violence in December 2013 and IGAD specifically requested the
Regional Protective Force in 2016. However, in the face of government
obstruction, this was not enough. The South Sudanese government prevents
UNMISS from accessing communities that require civilian protection. Similar to
the case of Sudan, no P5-level state has shown political will to engage with the
crisis in South Sudan to overcome the South Sudanese government’s
obstruction.
Further, even though UNMISS was authorized the day before South
Sudanese secession to protect civilians and help with nation-building, UNMISS
failed to protect civilians, most notably in July 2016 with the Juba massacre.
UNMISS troops lacked resources and therefore were unable to carry out their
civilian protection mandate. Taken together, the obstruction of the government
and the lack of rapid response capacity have led the crisis of mass atrocity crimes
in South Sudan to be an example of an unsuccessful implementation of R2P by
the Security Council.

4. Central African Republic
Since gaining independence from France in 1960, the Central African
Republic (CAR) has experienced near-constant political instability.303 In March
301
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2013, a predominantly Muslim rebel coalition known as Séléka overthrew the
government—the fifth coup d’état since independence—on account of political
grievances, including frustration with military disarmament and reintegration,
impunity for prior crimes committed, and lack of government presence
throughout the region.304 In September 2013, the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights reported that, in the four months leading up
to the March 2013 coup, both the government and Séléka forces “engaged in
summary executions and extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture
and looting of private and public property,” with the Séléka particularly
committing crimes of sexual violence and crimes against children.305 However,
even after the coup, the political and security situation in the CAR remained
unstable and Séléka forces perpetrated atrocities against civilian communities.
In response to the lack of accountability for human rights abuses by Séléka
forces, civilians began forming “anti-Balaka” self-defense groups, though these
groups quickly turned into more formal militias and began launching retaliation
attacks against Séléka forces.306 As tensions increased, political and social
inequalities between the groups devolved into religious and ethnic violence, with
Séléka forces attacking Christian communities and anti-Balaka groups retaliating
against Muslim communities.307 Even as the Séléka forces were officially
disbanded in September 2013, ex-Séléka fighters continued to perpetrate abuses
and violence against anti-Balaka groups.308
In response to the political instability, U.N. Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng and U.N. Special Adviser on the
Responsibility to Protect Jennifer Welsh issued a statement in October 2013
expressing concern over the inability of the transitional government to control
forces within its territory and stating that the rising religious tensions “opened
the door to the risk of atrocity crimes.”309 One week later, the Security Council
passed Resolution 2121, which reinforced the mandate of the U.N. field office in
light of the political transition process and invoked the CAR’s Pillar I R2P
obligations by “underscor[ing] the primary responsibility of the Central African
304
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authorities to protect the population.”310 Rather than establish a U.N.
peacekeeping mission, the resolution “look[ed] forward to the swift
establishment of MISCA,” the African-led International Support Mission in the
CAR.311 The backing of A.U.-led MISCA was the result of some Security
Council members who agreed with the A.U. that MISCA should attempt to
solve the crisis in the CAR before a full U.N. mission was deployed, even
though some Council members believed that a U.N.-led mission was
inevitable.312
One month later, the Security Council was briefed by Special Adviser
Dieng again, who stated that ex-Séléka elements and anti-Balaka militias had
committed “widespread acts of sexual violence . . . against women and children;
extrajudicial killing of civilians; enforced disappearances; arbitrary arrests,
detention and torture; as well as the destruction and looting of property,
including hospitals, schools and churches.”313 Special Adviser Dieng warned that
actions by both sides could “constitute crimes against humanity or war
crimes.”314 To the press, Special Adviser Dieng stated that the religious aspect of
the conflict “will end with Christian communities, Muslim communities killing
each other,” leading to the “possibility of a genocide occurring.”315
The deadliest clashes between ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka forces began in
December 2013. Within the first week of December, five hundred civilians had
been killed.316 Anti-Balaka forces committed mass atrocity crimes, brutally killing
Muslim civilians, destroying civilian property and killing animal stock.317 As exSéléka forces were forced to retreat from certain provinces, they attacked
Christian communities, killing civilians and destroying their property.318 By
January 2014, 935,000 CAR civilians had become IDPs—one-fifth of the CAR’s
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entire population—and 233,000 refugees had fled to neighboring countries.319
Responding to the surge of atrocity crimes against the civilian population,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 2127 on December 5, 2013.320 The
Resolution reminded the CAR’s transitional government of its Pillar I
responsibility to protect its civilian population and authorized the deployment of
MISCA, as well as supplemental French forces, with a mandate to use “all
necessary measures” for “the protection of civilians.”321 Furthermore, the
Resolution imposed an arms embargo on both parties to the conflict, raised the
possibility of targeted sanctions, and requested that the Secretary-General
“rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry” to investigate reports
of human rights abuses.322
Over the next several weeks, more troops were authorized for deployment
to assist the missions in the CAR, with the A.U. increasing its troop levels and
France deploying troops in accordance with Resolution 2127.323 In January 2014,
the Security Council also authorized the deployment of a separate E.U. force.324
Throughout this time, the A.U. and the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS) were coordinating the African-led missions in the CAR
and their requests for international assistance were largely for monetary support,
with the A.U. stating in November 2013 that “Central African challenges are
Africa’s challenges. Overcoming them successfully requires the mobilization of
the entire continent.”325
As the Security Council was authorizing these piecemeal regional
deployments, international pressure for an actual U.N. peacekeeping mission
was increasing. On December 20, 2013, Human Rights Watch said that the CAR
was “facing its R2P moment of truth,” and urged the Security Council to “waste
no time” in authorizing a full-fledged peacekeeping mission.326 In January 2014,
Special Adviser Dieng again briefed the Security Council, warning the Council
members that, if they delayed definitive action any longer, they would miss their
chance to “mobilize appropriate resources and to reverse one of the worst
319
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human rights and humanitarian crises of our time.”327 Special Adviser Dieng
called on the Security Council to act under Pillar II and III of its R2P obligations
and “uphold [its] responsibility to protect Central Africans from the risk of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”328
Meanwhile, reports were emerging that “rogue” Chadian peacekeepers
from MISCA had helped ex-Séléka forces to regroup by assisting their
movement across parts of the CAR, circumventing check points and thereby
facilitating atrocity crimes against civilians.329 In February 2014, in the face of
mounting evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the prosecutor
of the ICC announced the opening of a preliminary investigation into the
situation in the CAR.330
Responding to increasing pressure and recognizing that current
deployments were manifestly failing to stabilize the CAR and protect civilian
populations, the Security Council finally engaged with its full R2P obligations in
April 2014 by establishing the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) with Resolution 2149.331
MINUSCA was authorized to employ “all necessary means” to “protect, without
prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Central African Republic
authorities, the civilian population from threat of physical violence.”332
While MINUSCA’s deployment has kept violence against the civilian
population well below 2013-2014 levels, the CAR continues to experience bouts
of violence as fighting between ex-Séléka factions and anti-Balaka forces
persists.333 Further, the CAR has seen a new threat to civilian communities arise
in the form of the Lord’s Resistance Army.334 In light of ongoing civilian
protection concerns, MINUSCA is still active in the CAR and was recently
renewed until November 2017,335 while the sanctions regime was renewed until
327

Adama Dieng, The Statement of Under Secretary-General/Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide Mr. Adama Dieng on the Human Rights and Humanitarian Dimensions of the Crisis in
the Central African Republic, at 4 (Jan. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/P6EW-FPC5.

328

Id.

329

Central African Republic: Seleka Fighters Regroup in North, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 5, 2014),
https://perma.cc/Y526-B3BN.

330

Lizzie Dearden, Central African Republic: International Criminal Court Starts War Crimes Investigation,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/6QV8-68XW.

331

S.C. Res. 2149, ¶ 18 (Apr. 10, 2014).

332

Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30(a).

333

U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic,
U.N. Doc. S/2016/824 (Sept. 29, 2016).

334

Central Africa (Lord’s Resistance Army), GLOBAL CTR.
https://perma.cc/UBV8-XPAH (last updated June 28, 2016).

335

S.C. Res. 2301, ¶ 23 (Jul. 26, 2016).

Winter 2018

475

FOR

THE

RESP.

TO

PROTECT,

Chicago Journal of International Law

January 2018.336
While the actions of the Security Council have somewhat helped to
stabilize and support the transition process in the CAR since the full engagement
of MINUSCA, the crisis in the CAR nonetheless represents an unsuccessful
implementation of R2P by the Security Council. Similar to the case of the DRC,
though the government of CAR was not obstructing U.N. activities, cooperation
with regional authorities was lacking and the response time was significantly
delayed. Here, the coordination between regional authorities and the Security
Council was lacking in that the Security Council was overly deferential to
regional organizations like the A.U. and the ECCAS. Instead of engaging on a
deeper level with the conflict, the Security Council spent too much time allowing
underfunded and understaffed missions attempt to stabilize the crisis in the
CAR. As the international body charged with implementing R2P, the Security
Council should have played a more active role in assisting the A.U. with
coordinating resources for an R2P response. Further, neighboring states in the
region did not contribute to a political solution either; in fact, Chadian
peacekeepers’ support for ex-Séléka forces actually facilitated violence and
human rights abuses against civilian populations, thereby exacerbating the
problems.
The Security Council’s deferred reaction also meant that there was no rapid
response capacity. While MISCA and supplemental French and E.U. troops
were deployed relatively early, they were not enough to protect civilians from
mass atrocity crimes. MINUSCA itself was deployed well after the surge of
violence that threatened the civilian population. Ultimately, the Security
Council’s implementation of R2P in the situation in the CAR was unsuccessful
as it was too deferential to the leadership of regional authorities, which
deference delayed an effective response mechanism and failed to protect
civilians from mass atrocity crimes.
***
The four case studies in this Section demonstrate that the Security
Council’s implementation of R2P is generally unsuccessful when fewer than all
three conditions are met.
First, active government obstruction by the state perpetrating atrocity
crimes seriously hinders political action. Obstruction by the Sudanese and South
Sudanese governments hindered the deployment of U.N. missions and led to
A.U. missions that largely lacked resources to effectively carry out their mandate
to be the only presence in both countries as mass atrocity crimes were occurring.
Further, in none of these cases were there P5 member states that provided the
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political will to overcome government obstruction in order to launch a more
effective R2P response.
Second, cooperation between regional organizations and countries and the
Security Council was lacking in the cases of Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC. In
Sudan and the CAR, regional organizations like the A.U., the League of Arab
States, ECOWAS, and ECCAS were working to solve the local crises. While
regional organizations are essential to successfully implementing R2P, as the
R2P successes in Subsection A demonstrate, here, the cooperation and
communication between the organizations and the Security Council fell short. In
the case of Sudan, the A.U. and the League of Arab States were particularly
averse to Western- or U.N.-led intervention, which meant that the resources
available to a potential U.N.-led mission were unavailable to the humanitarian
crises. The statement of African leaders that Sudan was an “African
responsibility” was mirrored in the crisis in the CAR years later, when the A.U.
representative told the Security Council that the CAR presented an “African
challenge” to be met by engaging the whole continent of Africa—not the whole
international community. Deference to regional leadership in the context of R2P
delayed the reaction of the Security Council, whose role is to take a more active
leadership position in the case of an R2P crisis.
Additionally, in the cases of the DRC and the CAR, regional countries and
neighboring states actively undermined political stability and helped facilitate and
perpetrate atrocities against civilian populations. The DRC, Rwanda and Uganda
provided support and sent armed forces to support rebel groups, thereby
perpetrating and financing the commission of mass atrocity crimes. In the CAR,
rather than assisting with political stability, Chadian peacekeepers facilitated the
movement of ex-Séléka fighters to regroup, thereby also facilitating the
commission of further mass atrocity crimes. Both the aversion by regional
organizations and the active undermining by regional states in the crises in
Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC, contributed to the unsuccessful implementation
of R2P by the Security Council.
Third, all four cases demonstrate a lack of rapid response capacity. In all
four crises, U.N. missions were deployed either too late or with too few
resources to effectively carry out their civilian protection mandate. While the
response to the R2P crisis in the DRC was severely delayed, the authorization of
the Intervention Brigade demonstrates the potential of the Security Council’s
R2P engagement. The Brigade engaged under two conditions—regional and
Security Council cooperation as well as rapid response capacity—and was
successful in defeating the rebel group that had been perpetrating mass atrocity
crimes against civilian communities. The Brigade encapsulated the conditions
that helped make the three cases in Subsection A successful implementations of
R2P.
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Looking through the lens of the three conditions—government
obstruction, cooperation between regional authorities and the Security Council,
and rapid response capacity—the Security Council failed to implement its R2P
mandate in response to the crises in the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, and the
CAR. Each case was missing at least two of these crucial conditions. Just as the
successful implementations in Subsection A demonstrate that all three
conditions are necessary for proper implementation of R2P, a missing condition
means that the Security Council cannot properly implement R2P in order to
protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.

C. Unsuccessful Implementation of R2P Resulting From U.N.
Security Council Actual or Threatened Veto
A fourth condition has also prevented the Security Council from
successfully implementing its R2P mandate: the P5 veto. As all substantive
resolutions presented to the Security Council may be subject to a veto by any of
the P5, the use of the veto regarding an R2P-related resolution is always a
possibility. The four cases in this Section demonstrate that the Security Council
veto, or the mere threat of the veto, can stall R2P response from the beginning
or even after initial steps have been taken by the Security Council to implement
its R2P mandate. This condition is separate from the three discussed in
Subsections A and B because its presence stops Security Council action fully and
completely.

1. Yemen
Spurred on by the Arab Spring revolutions underway in nearby Tunisia and
Egypt, Yemenis took to the streets in mid-January 2011 to protest the rule of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power for over thirty years.337 As
protests spread throughout southern Yemeni cities, President Saleh deployed
security forces that clashed with protesters, leaving hundreds dead.338 In May
2011, leaders of the opposition and members of Saleh’s General People’s
Congress party agreed to a peace transition process, facilitated by the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), that would allow Saleh a “dignified exit,” but Saleh
refused to sign the agreement and continued to fight protesters and opposition
forces.339 In September 2011, the Secretary-General issued a statement
337
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condemning the “excessive use of force by government security forces against
unarmed protestors” while calling on government forces “to protect civilians
and uphold their obligations under applicable international law.”340
The Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s statement in
Resolution 2014, adopted in October 2011 (its first resolution on the situation in
Yemen).341 The resolution condemned the human rights violations committed by
Yemeni government forces and other third parties and reminded the Yemeni
government of its Pillar I obligation—its “primary responsibility to protect its
population.”342 Recognizing that a political resolution to the conflict would be
the surest way to prevent further civilian casualties, Resolution 2014 also backed
the GCC initiative for the peaceful transition of political power in Yemen.343
In November 2011, Saleh finally signed the GCC initiative, effectively
transferring power from himself to his deputy, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi—a
development that the Security Council commended as a step towards
implementing the “peaceful transition of power” envisioned by Resolution
2014.344 Under the GCC initiative, mass protests gave way to smaller
demonstrations as President Hadi convened a National Dialogue Conference
and began the constitution-drafting process. Throughout this time, the Security
Council received regular briefings from the Special Adviser345 and expressed its
continued support for a political resolution of the situation through the GCC,
condemning violence meant to derail the peace process.346
340
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After a period of relative calm and following the establishment of a
transition government in line with the GCC initiative, tensions again escalated
into violence in 2014. The Houthis, an armed rebel group representing Yemen’s
Shia minority, took advantage of the fledgling state of the transition government
and began a military campaign against President Hadi’s forces.347 Houthi forces
were joined by army units that had defected as well as other forces loyal to Saleh,
forming an ad-hoc opposition coalition that became known as the Popular
Committees.348 In response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2140 in
February 2014, which again expressed continued support for the political
transition process while also establishing a regime of targeted sanctions, in the
form of asset freezes and travel bans, against individuals determined to be
obstructing the political transition process or violating international human
rights or humanitarian law.349
By September 2014, the Popular Committees controlled over half of
Yemen’s governorates, including the capital city of Sanaa.350 In Sanaa, Houthi
leadership dissolved the parliament and took over the remaining government
institutions, drawing the condemnation of the Security Council and ultimately
forcing Hadi to flee the country in March 2015.351 Further violence stemmed
from a southern separatist movement, which was frustrated by its exclusion
from the GCC initiative political process.352 Other third-party terrorist groups,
including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also operated in parts of Yemen and sought to
capitalize on the instability created by the power transition.
Before being pushed into exile in March 2015, Hadi had requested the
military support of the Gulf States in countering the Houthis and bolstering his
government. When Hadi was forced out of Sanaa, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition353
answered his request for support by undertaking military airstrikes against the
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Popular Committees.354 By this point, the parties to conflict in Yemen had
solidified into two distinct sides: forces loyal to Hadi supported by the Saudi-led
coalition and forces loyal to Saleh supported by the Houthis (who, themselves,
were allegedly backed by Iran).355 Far from having a civilian protection mandate,
the Saudi-led coalition had the intention of decisively ending the civil conflict in
Yemen in favor of Hadi. In fact, the intervention by coalition forces increased
fighting throughout Yemen and led to mass civilian casualties due to its
indiscriminate bombing campaigns and active blockade of humanitarian
assistance.356
The protracted violence between coalition forces and the Popular
Committees soon led to international human rights and humanitarian law
violations being committed by both sides. In April 2015, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 2216, which urged a peaceful political solution to the
conflict, called on the Houthis to withdraw forces from seized areas and
surrender all arms, and formally established an arms embargo on Houthi forces
and forces loyal to former President Saleh.357 The resolution explicitly reaffirmed
“consistent with international humanitarian law, the need for all parties to ensure
the safety of civilians.”358
Nonetheless, Amnesty International reported in August 2015 that civilians
continued to be severely impacted as fighting had spread throughout twenty of
Yemen’s twenty-two governorates and both sides engaged in indiscriminate
airstrikes and ground attacks against civilians and civilian objects—thereby
violating international humanitarian law—while restricting humanitarian aid
access to communities that required basic assistance.359 A January 2016 report by
a U.N.-appointed panel of experts investigating the Saudi-led bombing campaign
further determined that coalition forces engaged in “widespread and systematic”
attacks on civilians in violation of international humanitarian law, including
“airstrikes targeting civilians and civilian objects . . . [like] medical facilities;
354
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schools; mosques; markets, factories, and food storage warehouses; and other
essential civilian infrastructure.”360 Human Rights Watch further condemned the
recruitment of child soldiers, restrictions on humanitarian access, arbitrary
detention, torture, and forced disappearance.361
As fighting continued to rage throughout Yemen, the Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights released its own report in August 2016
stating that both parties to the conflict had committed violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians
and civilian areas, recruitment of child soldiers, forced displacement, and sexual
violence.362 The following month, members of the Human Rights Council
sought to build on the report’s findings by establishing an independent
international commission of inquiry into the situation in Yemen, but the
measure failed to gain the necessary votes.363
Despite mounting reports of shocking and indiscriminate attacks against
civilians, the U.S. and U.K. support the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts, and many of
the weapons used against civilians by coalition forces in Yemen can be traced
back to U.S. and U.K. sales.364 Given that two P5 members are thus aligned with
the forces responsible for so much of the civilian toll, it is unsurprising that the
Security Council’s only action to implement R2P in Yemen since 2015 has been
to renew pre-existing sanctions.365
A sustained ceasefire and political stability remain elusive to this day. The
latest U.N.-led peace talks concluded in August 2016 without an agreement.366
While the Security Council continues to release statements calling on all parties
in Yemen to lay down arms and pursue a political solution to end the conflict,367
Hadi and his forces state that, unless Security Council Resolution 2216 is fully
enforced—with Houthi rebels withdrawing from Yemeni areas and surrendering
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all arms unconditionally—the political process cannot continue.368
In January 2017, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that 10,000 civilians had been killed and 40,000 wounded during
the two-year conflict.369 As of July 2017, 17 million people in Yemen were food
insecure and 2.9 million were internally displaced.370 Protracted conflict has also
caused a cholera epidemic to spread throughout Yemen, killing more than 1,700
people in the span of less than three months, as medical infrastructure was
targeted in bombing campaigns and humanitarian assistance remains limited.371
While the Security Council invoked R2P relatively early on—
reminding Yemen of its Pillar I obligations to protect civilians in Resolution
2014 and imposing targeted sanctions on human rights abusers—the Security
Council has failed to fully engage with R2P in Yemen. In subsequent resolutions,
the Security Council has framed the conflict in Yemen as strictly a civil war,
rather than a situation in which mass atrocity crimes are being committed against
civilians. Though the Security Council repeatedly called on all warring parties in
Yemen to observe international human rights and humanitarian laws, it has not
explicitly invoked R2P’s Pillar II or Pillar III, likely since any further action to
implement R2P would be blocked by the P5 countries involved in the Saudi-led
intervention. Further, the Saudi-led intervention is itself not an R2P intervention
as it was deployed without the formal authorization of the Security Council and
without a mandate to protect civilians—and has, in fact, led to more civilian
deaths and injuries. Overall, the Security Council veto, as well as the framing of
the conflict as a civil war, has created a crisis in which mass atrocity crimes
continue to be committed and further R2P implementation seems unlikely.

2. Syria
In March 2011, fifteen kids in the Syrian town of Dara’a were thrown in jail
for writing the words, “[t]he people want the regime to fall,” on a wall.372 Local
protests erupted in response and soon spread across the country, becoming an
outlet for a broader range of grievances against Syria’s authoritarian regime.373
From the outset, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad responded with brutality,
368
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directing his security forces to open fire on protesters and even sending tanks
into towns and villages.374 Signaling the regime’s intention to continue this
shocking violence against its own civilians, it soon imposed a total media
blackout, preventing international journalists from entering the country and
detaining local journalists who covered the protests.375
By summer 2011, the relative silence of the international community had
empowered the Syrian regime to brazenly employ violence to maintain its rule.
When the regime felt it was losing control of the city of Hama—a scene of many
of the largest protests—in July 2011, it responded by unleashing cannon fire and
machine guns on unarmed residents.376 On August 3, 2011, after nearly five
months of the Syrian regime’s relentless attacks on its own population, the
Security Council issued its first formal statement condemning the use of force
against civilians.377
As Syrian civilians and military defectors began forming armed opposition
groups in an attempt to counter the regime’s attacks,378 the government’s violent
repression of the civilian population only escalated.379 While the Security Council
met to consider a draft resolution that would have condemned the Syrian
government’s abuses and raised the specter of future sanctions, the measure was
ultimately vetoed by China and Russia, who judged inaction to be in their best
interest given their economic and political relationships with the al-Assad
regime.380, 381 Acting with the decisiveness that the Security Council had lacked,
the League of Arab States moved to suspend Syria in November 2011 and
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announced that it would impose economic and political sanctions in response to
the government’s failure to put an end to the violence.382
The same month, a commission of inquiry established by the Human
Rights Council during the early stages of the crisis released its first report,
detailing “patterns of summary execution, arbitrary arrest, enforced
disappearance, [and] torture” by government forces, and suggesting that these
abuses “may amount to crimes against humanity.”383 In December 2011, U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay personally briefed the
Security Council, stressing that crimes against humanity were likely being
committed and urging the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the
ICC.384 If the members of the Security Council had had any doubt as to whether
the violence in Syria met the threshold of R2P action, such doubt was no longer
possible.
In light of these calls to action, the Security Council again met to consider a
draft resolution on Syria in February 2012, as al-Assad’s forces were mercilessly
shelling civilian residences in the city of Homs.385 The proposed measure, which
would have echoed the overwhelming international calls for al-Assad to step
down, was again blocked by Russia and China—an outcome met with fury by
the other permanent members of the Council.386 The Executive Director of the
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect stated after the vote that the
Security Council had been reduced to “a mere spectator of crimes against
humanity in Syria.”387
While the Security Council’s internal divisions relegated it to the sidelines,
former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan attempted to fill the leadership void
as Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on
the Syrian Crisis.388 When Annan proposed a six-point plan to end the crisis, the
382
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Security Council endorsed the plan and encouraged the Syrian government to
abide by it.389 However, the Council did remarkably little to actually enforce the
plan. On April 14, 2012, the Security Council passed Resolution 2042—its first
resolution on the crisis in Syria—authorizing the preliminary deployment of
thirty unarmed military observers to monitor the ceasefire component of the
Special Envoy’s plan.390 While the Security Council increased the number of
military observers from 30 to 300 a week later, establishing the U.N.
Stabilization Mission in Syria (UNSMIS),391 the effort remained thoroughly
insufficient. The Security Council quietly admitted defeat and disbanded
UNSMIS in July 2012.392 Annan, frustrated by the “finger-pointing and namecalling in the Security Council” and lamenting the resulting lack of “serious,
purposeful and united international pressure,” resigned as Special Envoy the
following month.393
Without the threat of coercive action by the Security Council, the Syrian
regime continued its strategy of collective punishment, deploying the full extent
of its air power against civilians in rebel-held areas.394 In November 2012, the
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces emerged as
the unified front for the opposition groups, excluding Islamist militias, and soon
gained the recognition of the U.S., U.K., France, Turkey, Spain, the League of
Arab States, and the Gulf states as the legitimate representative of the Syrian
people.395 Despite this recognition, the rebel groups were also guilty of
committing atrocities against civilians, as the U.N. Commission of Inquiry had
evidenced in its August 2012 report.396
By the end of 2012, the fighting in Syria had evolved into a full-scale civil
war, and casualties were steadily increasing.397 Amid concerns that the Syrian
regime had begun using banned chemical weapons against civilians, a U.N.
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investigative team was dispatched in August 2013.398 Just days after the team
arrived, al-Assad launched the deadliest chemical weapon attack yet, using Sarin
gas to kill hundreds of civilians in Ghouta—including many children.399 The
audacity of the attack shocked the international community and prompted a
Security Council emergency briefing later that same evening, but Russia and
China reportedly blocked a formal resolution at that time.400 After a U.N. team
of experts definitively confirmed the use of Sarin gas in September 2013, the
Security Council responded with a unanimous resolution requiring the
verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, in
accordance with a deal reached by the U.S. and Russia, and promising to impose
coercive Chapter VII measures in the case of noncompliance.401
While the destruction of these stockpiles—albeit a partial destruction402—
was an important step, the Syrian regime continued using more traditional heavy
weapons against civilians and blocking the delivery of desperately-needed
humanitarian aid to civilian areas.403 On February 22, 2014, the Security Council
passed a resolution demanding that Syrian authorities allow humanitarian access
and threatening to take unspecified “further steps” in the case of
noncompliance.404 This marked the first resolution in which the Security Council
explicitly acknowledged the Syrian government’s “primary responsibility to
protect its population” under R2P.405 When al-Asaad continued to abrogate that
responsibility and deny humanitarian aid for the Syrian people, the Security
Council adopted a new resolution authorizing cross-border humanitarian access
without the consent of the state.406 This measure, renewed in December 2014,407
did allow for marginally more aid to reach the people of Syria, but the demand
for aid far outpaced its delivery as the crisis continued unabated.408
398
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In the years that followed, the Bashar al-Assad regime continued to defy
international humanitarian law and flout whatever resolutions the Security
Council managed to pass, confident that the support of veto-wielding permanent
members Russia and China would shield it from serious punishment. That the
regime has proven correct in this regard marks the most serious failure of the
Security Council to date. While the Security Council had, in 2013, promised to
impose Chapter VII measures in the case of future chemical weapon use, recent
chemical weapons attacks have failed to produce this response.409 Despite the
ongoing targeting of civilians and the obstruction of humanitarian aid, coercive
measures such as sanctions or an ICC referral continue to be blocked by Russia
and China.410 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al
Hussein expressed his disappointment in the Security Council’s failure in this
regard, stating that “the persistent failure of the Security Council to refer the
situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court is an example of the most
shameful form of realpolitik.”411
Moreover, the lack of unified action on Syria has allowed it to become a
proxy war, with individual nations picking sides and undertaking unilateral
actions that have further devastated the civilian population. The most recent
report of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry accused Russia of complicity in the
war crimes being committed by the Syrian government, highlighting the
improbability of a unified Security Council response to the continuing crisis.412
As of July 2017, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had
documented roughly 475,000 deaths since the start of the violence, including
nearly 100,000 civilian casualties.413 UNHCR reports that 13.5 million people in
Syria are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, with 4.53 million of those
people in inaccessible areas.414 Under the watch of the Security Council, the crisis
has caused more than 5 million people to flee the country as refugees, and has
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left a further 6.3 million people internally displaced—the largest number of
people displaced by any conflict in the world.415

3. Myanmar (Burma)
The Burmese people have suffered through a litany of human rights abuses
since a military coup d’état in 1962 ended democratic rule in Myanmar.
International calls for action by U.N. officials and human rights advocates have
intensified to the threshold of R2P invocation in response to abuses by the
military junta, including: its violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in the
2007 Saffron Revolution, its hapless response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and,
most recently, its persecution of the minority Muslim Rohingya community.416
Between 1996 and 2007, military forces destroyed or displaced 3,600 villages and
perpetrated crimes against humanity as a means to instill fear in the civilian
population.417 The military has also consistently killed civilians to repress political
activity and peaceful demonstrations, implementing a “shoot on sight” policy in
the ethnic minority areas of eastern Myanmar.418 The U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Myanmar has labeled the state’s failure to stem this violence as a “wilful [sic]
abrogation of its responsibility under international humanitarian law.”419
In recent years, violence against minority ethnic groups has drawn
international attention. Particularly, longstanding tensions between Buddhists in
Rakhine State and Rohingya Muslims have erupted into a series of violent
attacks since 2012, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing tens of
thousands.420 Most recently on October 9, 2016, a series of attacks on Myanmar
border police left nine police officers dead.421 Declaring a state of emergency, the
government authorized police security forces to pursue “security clearing
operations” throughout Rakhine State, which has led to an “unprecedented”
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level of violence by the government against the Rohingya people.422 In February
2017, OHCHR expressed concern that the clearing operations are a systematic
and widespread government policy of ethnic cleansing.423 Crimes committed by
government forces include: “extrajudicial executions or other killings, including
by random shooting; enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention; rape,
including gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence; physical assault
including beatings; torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; looting and occupation of property; destruction of property; and
ethnic and religious discrimination and persecution.”424 As of May 2017,
UNHCR estimates a total of 420,000 Rohingyan refugees in surrounding
countries (43,000 of whom fled to Bangladesh immediately after the October
2016 attacks) as well as 120,000 internally displaced.425
U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng stated
reported crimes “could amount to crimes against humanity.”426 The U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee echoed
these concerns.427 The Human Rights Council has called for an independent
factfinding mission into these allegations of human rights violence and abuses by
government forces, particularly focused on Rakhine State.428 The Myanmar
government has stated it would not accept a U.N. mission.429 Without credible
engagement by the Security Council, systematic persecution threatens the
survival of ethnic groups in Myanmar, particularly the Rohingya community.
The Security Council has not invoked R2P regarding Myanmar, going back
to when the country’s situation was placed on its permanent agenda in 2006.
Apart from a presidential statement that deplored the violence enacted upon

422

Off. of the High Comm’r of Hum. Rts. Mission to Bangl., Flash Report: Interviews with
Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar Since 9 October 2016, at 42 (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://perma.cc/UZ73-WB62.

423

Id.

424

Id. at 40.

425

Vivian Tan, Over 168,000 Rohingya Likely Fled Myanmar Since 2012—UNHCR Report, U.N. HIGH
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (May 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/CH3A-GH6K.

426

Press Release, United Nations, Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on
the Prevention of Genocide Following OHCHR’s Report on the Situation in Northern Rakhine
State, Myanmar, U.N. Press Release (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/B5GN-NKHP.

427

Yanghee Lee (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/67 (Mar. 1,
2017).

428

Human Rights Council Res. 34/22, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/34/22 (Mar. 24, 2017).

429

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, South Sudan, 33 R2P MONITOR, at 9 (May 15,
2017), https://perma.cc/JYS2-F32P.

490

Vol. 18 No. 2

The U.N. Security Council’s Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect

Genser

demonstrators during the Saffron Revolution,430 the Security Council has not
substantively engaged on the application of R2P to Myanmar. Russia and China
rejected a 2007 draft resolution, which had called on the Myanmar government
to cease military attacks against civilians and would have established a basis for
invoking R2P.431 The draft resolution expressed, “deep concern at large-scale
human rights violations in Myanmar, as cited in the report of the Special
Rapporteur of 21 September 2006, including violence against unarmed civilians
by the Myanmar military, unlawful killings, torture, [and] rape . . . .”432 Though
U.N. High Commissioner Zeid Ra’ad and U.N. Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide Dieng have alluded to R2P in their February 2017
statements,433 there has not been an invocation of the doctrine by the Security
Council because of Russia and China’s continued insistence that Myanmar’s
internal conflict does not threaten international peace and security. With the
U.K. requesting the Security Council be seized of the situation in Myanmar434 as
well as the recent reports of atrocities by the U.N. High Commissioner on
Human Rights and Special Advisers, the Security Council is under pressure to
consider the situation in Rakhine State. But any implementation of R2P by the
Security Council has remained stalled under threat of a Chinese and Russian
veto.

4. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Since Kim Il-sung consolidated the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) under the control of the Korean Worker’s Party in the aftermath
of the Korean War, the state has exerted almost total control over its citizens.
Dissent against the regime’s rule is punishable by death or indefinite detention in
a forced labor camp.435 Over the past 30 years, more than 400,000 people are
estimated to have died in the DPRK’s modern-day gulag system, which
continues to imprison over 200,000 people in near-starvation conditions.
Prisoners in political prison camps are subject to brutal conditions of gross
human rights violations, including: forced labor; torture and solitary
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confinement; food rations below subsistence levels; severe lack of sanitation;
witnessing or being subject to public executions, rape, or forced abortions; and
lack of adequate medical care leading to death or the spread of diseases.436 Under
the Three Generation Rule, three generations of family members of the accused
must be imprisoned as traitors.437 While the number of prisoners has decreased
in recent years, human rights organizations note that this is possibly the result of
the number of deaths from such brutal conditions rather than a change in
government prison policies.438
Further, the government’s practice of assigning food rations based on
loyalty to the regime and its prioritization of military spending, compounded by
natural disasters that have destroyed crop growth, have led to the deaths of at
least one million people since the 1990s and continue to endanger the lives of
some eighteen million people.439 Food relief provided by countries and
international relief organizations rarely reaches those communities most affected
by famine and is often allocated to those most loyal to the regime.440 In 2016, an
estimated one-fourth of all children in the DPRK were stunted due to “chronic
malnutrition” and two-thirds of the population were food insecure.441 Only
sixteen percent of households had adequate food consumption.442
The movement to classify the human rights atrocities in the DPRK under
R2P was led initially by civil society groups and now by various U.N. bodies. In
2006, former Czech Republic President Václav Havel, former Norwegian Prime
Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel
commissioned the first report that comprehensively reviewed human rights
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violations in the DPRK to both apply the responsibility to protect and to
conclude that North Korea was committing crimes against humanity.443 In
March 2013, the Human Rights Council created a commission of inquiry on
human rights in the DPRK, which first directed the attention of the U.N. to the
“systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations [that] have been and
are being committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”444 In its
Washington hearing, the COI heard specific testimony advocating for the
application of the responsibility to protect to the situation in the DPRK.445 The
COI’s 2014 report stressed that “the gravity, scale, and nature of these violations
reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.”446 The
report explicitly referenced R2P and called on the international community to
“accept its responsibility to protect the people of the [DPRK] from crimes
against humanity.”447 The DPRK condemned the report as part of an “anti[DPRK] ‘human rights’ racket” at the U.N.448
In response to the Commission’s 2014 report, the Security Council
convened a special session to discuss the DPRK’s human rights issues and voted
to place the issue on its permanent agenda—a procedural decision that is not
subject to the veto.449 However, despite the Commission’s unambiguous
invocation of R2P and initial signs of momentum, the Security Council has
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neglected to meaningfully engage with its responsibility to uphold R2P in the
DPRK.450 The Security Council declined to refer the DPRK to the ICC (one of
the Commission’s central recommendations) and has not pursued any resolution
directly criticizing the DPRK’s human rights violations due in large part to the
likelihood of a veto from China or Russia, if not from both.451 China attempted
to block the Security Council from holding its second meeting on human rights
in the DPRK in 2015, marking the first time a procedural vote has been held on
an item already on the Security Council’s agenda.452 The meeting was held
despite China’s protests, with the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs stating that, “the international community has a collective responsibility
to protect the population of the DPRK.”453 However, no substantive resolutions
resulted from the meeting.
In the absence of meaningful Security Council action, various other U.N.
bodies have sought to address human rights violations in the DPRK and have
called on the international community to act. In a 2014 resolution, the Human
Rights Council called for the creation of a field office for monitoring and
documenting abuses in the DPRK, which was established in Seoul in June 2015
and now helps provide updated reports regarding the human rights situation.454
In the most recent report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in the DPRK—a position created by the Human Rights
Council—the Rapporteur identified the extensive political prisoner system and
the food security crises as two central issues in a long list of human rights
violations.455 The Rapporteur, in conjunction with two independently appointed
experts, also recommended a dual-pronged approach for holding the DPRK
regime accountable for its crimes against humanity.456 The Secretary-General
issued his own report on the human rights violations in the DPRK in October
2016, echoing earlier reports of extensive violations and calling on the regime to
engage with human rights organizations and the U.N. to stem human rights
450
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abuses.457 Finally, the General Assembly—free of the Security Council’s
debilitating veto yet unable to wield the necessary power to implement the R2P
doctrine—has regularly passed resolutions condemning the DPRK’s human
rights violations, most recently in December 2016.458
Various Security Council members continue to push for the Council to
engage on the human rights violations of the DPRK regime, but the continued
threat of a veto from Russia and China has precluded substantive engagement. In
November 2016, however, the Security Council did manage to pass Resolution
2321, which for the first time included a provision calling on the DPRK to ensure
the “welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK” and linking this
directly to the DPRK’s detrimental pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles.459 The following month, the Council convened to discuss the human
rights situation in the DPRK and nine countries, including the U.S. and the U.K.,
voted to keep human rights issues in the DPRK as an agenda item.460 Predictably,
China and Russia (along with three other members) objected to maintaining the
issue on the Security Council’s permanent agenda, stating that the primary
responsibility of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace
and security rather than being, as China said, “a forum for discussing human
rights issues,” which is “of no benefit whatsoever.”461 While the Security Council
kept the human rights discussion on its agenda, there has been no further
substantive R2P engagement.
Even as human rights advocates have demanded stronger Security Council
action in the form of a Chapter VII resolution calling on the DPRK to release all
political prisoners, demanded open access to all parts of the country for
humanitarian aid organizations, and referred allegations of crimes against
humanity to the International Criminal Court,462 the Security Council has so far
failed to meaningfully engage with the systematic and widespread human rights
violations in DPRK. While largely overlooked by many scholars and human
rights advocates engaged with R2P,463 the severity of atrocities and human rights
violations—reportedly ten out of the eleven egregious acts that the Rome Statute
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of the ICC defines as crimes against humanity have been committed by the
DPRK against its citizens464—requires the Security Council to engage with the
R2P doctrine in order to end mass atrocity crimes in the DPRK.
***
These four case studies demonstrate the overruling power of the Security
Council veto in preventing the implementation of the Council’s R2P mandate.
In the case of Yemen, while the Security Council invoked Yemen’s Pillar I R2P
responsibility, there has been no further action to implement R2P, because the
U.S. and U.K. continue to assist the Saudi-led intervention, which is arguably
helping perpetrate mass atrocity crimes against Yemeni civilians. In the cases of
Syria, Myanmar, and the DPRK, the Security Council has been stalled because of
the veto or threatened veto of Russia and China. Even if other factors like
government obstruction, cooperation between regional organizations and the
Security Council, and rapid response capacity may be missing in these cases,
these conditions are secondary to the fourth factor of the veto, which has
effectively stopped all Security Council action. As meaningful engagement with
the Security Council’s R2P mandate in these crisis situations remains gridlocked,
governments continue to perpetrate and enable mass atrocity crimes against
civilian populations.

IV. R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S F O R I M P R O V I N G T H E U.N. S E C U R I T Y
C O U N C I L ’ S I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F R2P
The preceding historical analysis of the Security Council’s country-specific
implementation of R2P demonstrates the complexities and singularities that set
each situation apart, but it also allows for the emergence of a set of factors that,
when taken together, consistently have determined whether the Security Council
will succeed or fail in its responsibility to implement R2P. What follows are
recommendations for achieving better outcomes along those key factors, with
the overarching goal of improving future Security Council implementation of
R2P.

A. Political Will
In any situation that requires the involvement of the Security Council to
effectively protect a population from mass atrocities, the government in
question’s willingness to accept the aid of the Security Council can either lower
the bar for Council engagement or dramatically raise it. In situations where the
government is willing to accept Security Council involvement, the barriers to
464
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engagement and thus the political will required of the Council members to
engage are manageable. However, in situations where the government is
unwilling to accept Security Council involvement, the bar for engagement
becomes much higher and must be overcome with much greater political will
from the Council members, usually requiring the strong support of an influential
P5 member.
In Côte d’Ivoire and in Mali, the legitimate governments welcomed
Security Council involvement, allowing the Council to engage with its R2P
responsibility with relative ease and, ultimately, with success. In Libya, while the
government did not welcome Security Council action, the extraordinary political
will of the U.S., the U.K., and France to engage with their R2P responsibilities
through the Security Council overcame the increased barriers to engagement.
Conversely, the Security Council’s engagement fell short in Sudan and South
Sudan, where the government’s resistance to Council action was not overcome
by a P5 member’s strong will to engage.
While the political will of the Security Council members to engage with the
Council’s R2P responsibility will always be subject to concerns of national selfinterest to some degree, elevating the profile of abuses taking place in a country
can occasionally shift the balance of political will in favor of engagement. Civil
society groups’ and U.N. human rights bodies’ work to highlight ongoing abuses
helps Security Council members understand the urgency of acting in a particular
situation while also creating public pressure on Council members to act, with
both of those mechanisms tending to increase the overall political will to engage.
In the interest of positively influencing the political will of Security Council
member states to engage with their R2P responsibilities, the international
community should increase its support for civil society groups and U.N. human
rights bodies that alert the Council to abuses and hold the Council accountable
for its response. Given this crucial role with regard to R2P, it is unacceptable
that just 3.5 percent of the U.N. general budget goes towards the organization’s
human rights bodies,465 and members of the international community should
seek to correct this.

B. Cooperation with Regional Organizations
Given the global scope of the U.N.’s work and the vast demands on the
organization, regional organizations can play an important role in responding to
R2P situations. When regional organizations are substantially involved in such
situations, those organizations’ attitudes towards Security Council involvement
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can profoundly shape the Council’s own response—for better or worse. When
regional organizations welcome Security Council engagement and defer to the
Council to coordinate the international response, the Council is better able to
engage with its R2P responsibility and more likely to be successful in responding
to the situation. When regional organizations discourage or reject Security
Council engagement, the Council is more likely to defer a response and abandon
its coordination role—actions which can have devastating effects if regional
organizations ultimately fail to resolve the situation.
Effective cooperation with ECOWAS in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, with the
GCC and the League of Arab States in the case of Libya, and with the A.U. and
ECOWAS in the case of Mali—cooperation characterized by regional
organizations’ acceptance of Security Council involvement, the Council’s
receptiveness to the requests of regional organizations, and the Council’s central
coordination role—enabled the Security Council to engage with its R2P
responsibility in a timely and decisive manner in those cases. Conversely, the
A.U.’s hostility towards Security Council involvement and leadership in the cases
of Darfur and the CAR delayed meaningful Council engagement under R2P and
handicapped the Council’s eventual response. The actions of regional powers
Rwanda and Uganda undermined Security Council R2P efforts in the DRC and
precluded both a strong regional response and regional coordination with the
Council.
To have a coordinated response from the Security Council and regional
actors in future R2P situations, the Council needs to focus on the actions of
regional organizations, support the work of regional organizations, and also rise
to its role of coordinating a coherent international R2P response. To enhance
this capability, the U.N. should undertake capacity-building efforts with key
regional organizations and build joint response mechanisms with those
organizations to establish a greater degree of trust and better coordinate future
responses to emerging R2P crises.466

C. Rapid Response Capacity
Once the Security Council makes the decision to engage with its R2P
responsibility, the international community’s ability to respond rapidly to the
situation on the ground is of crucial importance. Because U.N. missions take an
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average of six months to deploy,467 even the immediate authorization of a U.N.
mission may not allow for a sufficiently timely response to a rapidly escalating
R2P situation. Some of the factors that can enable a rapid response include: the
presence of a previously established and well-equipped U.N. mission, the
willingness and ability of relevant regional organizations to quickly deploy their
own resources, and the willingness and ability of outside countries to quickly
deploy their own resources. The presence of at least one of those factors can
increase the chances that the Security Council response will effectively prevent
mass atrocities.
In the cases of Libya and Mali, outside countries were willing and able to
respond rapidly, saving the lives of countless civilians. In the case of Libya, the
U.S., U.K., and France declared their intention to act the day after the Security
Council adopted a resolution authorizing them to do so, and had deployed the
necessary forces within a week. Likewise, in the case of Mali, France responded
the day after receiving Security Council authorization. In the case of Côte
d’Ivoire, a rapid response was enabled by the existence of a previously
established mission on the ground, in addition to short-term borrowing of
forces and equipment from a well-equipped mission in nearby Liberia.
Conversely, outside countries were not especially willing to marshal their own
resources to respond rapidly to situations in the DRC, Sudan, and the CAR, and
previously established U.N. and regional missions in those countries were underequipped and unable to respond rapidly as the situations on the ground
deteriorated.
Because the conditions necessary for a country-led or region-led rapid
response may not always be present and the existence of a previously established
and well-equipped U.N. mission cannot be assumed, there is a real need for the
U.N. to develop a rapid response capacity. The most feasible and sustainable
way in which to do this may well be for the U.N. to contract private military and
security companies to serve as a standing rapid-reaction force on a short-term
basis.468 The Security Council members should give this and other arrangements
for a rapid-reaction force serious consideration in order to enable a timely
response to future R2P situations.

D. The Veto
While the aforementioned factors weigh heavily on the likelihood of
successful Security Council engagement on the basis of R2P, the most significant
467
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factor of all lies in the institutional architecture of the Security Council itself.
According to the U.N. Charter, the permanent five members of the Security
Council—China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.—have the power to
block any Council resolution to which they do not concur.469 That this power
has repeatedly been invoked to block Security Council efforts to halt mass
atrocity crimes is unacceptable. In Yemen, Syria, Myanmar, and the DPRK, the
use or threatened use of the veto by one or more permanent members of the
Security Council has resulted in the continuation of mass atrocity crimes and
tremendous loss of life.
Many observers have noted that, “the use or abuse of the veto is
responsible for some of the [U.N. Security] Council’s most conspicuous failures,
when it does not intervene in time, or with sufficient force, to protect the
victims of genocide and other comparable crimes.”470 Some of those observers
have also proposed potential solutions to this problem, with the France/Mexico
Initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct emerging as the two most widely
supported proposals.471 As of June 2017, 93 U.N. member states had signed
onto the France/Mexico Initiative calling for the voluntary restraint of the veto
in mass atrocity situations and 111 member states had signed onto the ACT
Code of Conduct calling upon all Security Council members to refrain from
voting against efforts to prevent or halt mass atrocities and requiring
transparency from vetoing states on their reasons for employing the veto.472 The
Security Council should seriously consider the adoption of either the ACT Code
of Conduct or the France/Mexico Initiative to restrain the use of the veto in
mass atrocity situations and rise to meet its R2P responsibility, and the U.N.
Secretary-General and broader international community should demand that the
Council do so.

V. C O N C L U S I O N
Much has happened since the initial discussions of R2P in 2001 and the
formal adoption of R2P into the U.N. system in 2005. The doctrine of R2P grew
out of the failure of the international community to respond to governments
committing widespread and systematic atrocity crimes against their own people
in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s. The development and
adoption of R2P was meant to codify existing responsibilities under international
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law and provide a better mechanism to prevent similar atrocity crimes in the
future.
Since its adoption, the Security Council has acted on its R2P mandate at
various times, both successfully and unsuccessfully. R2P implementations were
successful when the government did not obstruct international efforts to assist
with the prevention of mass atrocity crimes (or when such obstruction was
overcome by a powerful country’s desire to engage to protect civilians),
cooperation existed between regional organizations and the Security Council,
and the Council had the capacity to respond rapidly to the developing or
imminent crisis. In all unsuccessful implementations, at least two of these
conditions were notably absent. Further, a fourth and overriding condition—the
use of the veto by a Security Council P5 member—has prevented the Security
Council from successfully implementing R2P in certain cases regardless of the
other conditions.
Examining both the successful and unsuccessful cases of R2P
implementation allows for important takeaways that can inform the Security
Council’s actions in future invocations of R2P. As Section III notes,
international institutions can be strengthened to encourage and support the
existence of the three necessary conditions while internal institutional
commitments by Security Council members can ensure that the veto does not
obstruct collective action in the face of future mass atrocity crimes.
While the Security Council’s inaction regarding the crisis in Syria stands
front and center in recent memory, a more comprehensive analysis of Security
Council implementation of R2P reveals that there is more to R2P than this
notable failure might suggest. As is evident in the preceding analysis of Security
Council implementation of R2P since its codification in 2005, certain conditions
must be present to allow for successful implementation, and there is much that
can be done to foster the presence of those conditions. It is now up to the
international community to strengthen the institutions and mechanisms that will
allow the Security Council to respond in a timely and decisive manner to future
mass atrocity crimes and more consistently uphold its responsibility to protect.
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